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Because of the unique features of electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and Hazardous
Electromagnetic Effects on Ordnance (HERO), much research and money has gone into
protecting weapon systems and ordnance against it. The EMP and HERO phenomena
do have a variety of differences and require differences of hardening technique to protect
against it. However, they both involve radiation effects and can prematurely initiate
ordnance via the electroexplosive device (EED). Protection of weapon systems and
ordnance against electronic damage and upset plus EED initiation takes on more of an
art form rather than science once basic principles are applied. Nevertheless by relating
these two programs via the initiating temperature of the EED. they can be accurately
compared with each other. Because of this observation, the two programs can be
effectively combined to work jointly on ordnance hardening and protection including all
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Since the early 1 SCO's it has been discovered that electromagnetic waves can produce
current in wires. In the early 1960's this knowledge resulted in the formation of the
Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Ordnance (HERO) program and the
Electromagnetic Vulnerability (EMV) program to protect naval ordnance and weapon
systems from premature detonation. Also in the early 1960's it was discovered that an
Electromagnetic Pulse from a high altitude nuclear explosion could prematurely
detonate ordnance and weapon systems as well. But, it was not until the 1980s that an
EMP program receive full recognition and support.
The HERO program has extensively tested the detonating devices called
Electroexplosive devices (EED's) which heat up and initiate the detonation via current
flow. The HERO program also has developed very skilled and creative hardening
designs for those ordnance and weapon systems containing EED's. The problem is how
much HERO data can be used by the relatively new EMP program? Can the HERO
data on EED current firing be transformed to reflect an EMP or are each phenomena
so different that comparisons of data are futile? Would there be any major or minor
changes in the hardening design for EMP hardening of a weapon system versus what
would be necessary to ensure HERO safety? Are there reliable equations that can
accurately relate the different radiation phenomena (i.e.. EMP and HERO) to actual
initiation or detonation? Is there in turn a transfer function to bridge the gap totally
from EMP to HERO and vice versa?
By carefully and thoughly studying each phenomena and by carefully reviewing
hardening against electromagnetic radiation, it is hoped that some common areas
between the two phenomena might surface. These common areas can be built upon by
investigating the mechanism of initiation or detonation under a variety of conditions
thus including EMP and HERO type conditions. Because the EED's are thermally
ignited, it is feasible to include heat flow dynamics as well as fundamental
electromagnetic theory. By combining these two disciplines the problem should be able
to be solved.
If it is possible for data to be shared among the two programs and that data can be
used to interpret its own effects, then valuable resources and time can be saved in
forming EMP standards for the fleet. Also it will be possible for both programs to
effectively combine resources and cover all electromagnetic radiation hazards jointly and
set a single design standard for the hardening of ordnance or weapon systems. In
addition it would be possible to cover other transient outside the purview of either
program at opposite ends of the time and power spectrum.
By covering EMP and HERO first the reader is introduced into the phenomena with
a little historical background to gain a perspective. The chapter on Hardening covers
techniques as well as design of hardening and many of the common elements in the two
programs become clear. After briefly discussing the EED and the testing methods for
each program, the Analysis chapter serves to not only introduce the heat flow dynamics
but link it up with electromagnetic theory. This linking of the two disciplines is
represented in the transfer function. The transfer functions show how" an EMP or
electromagnetic radiation generated from antenna power source can be converted into
a current function which in turn results in ohmic heatinc for initiation.
II. ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE (EMP)
A. EMP GENERATION
1. Introduction
As seen in appendix A EMP generated by a nuclear explosion has been of
interest since 1945. It was not until the early 1960s that hardening of military systems
became an open concern. Also it was in the early 1960s that high altitude EMP burst
mechanisms were understood. Since that time simulators and computer coded
simulations have aided scientists in understanding the EMP.
When there is a high altitude burst, the emitted x-rays and gamma rays produce
no fireball because of the low air density. Also, because of the low density atmosphere
the photons travel much farther than at lower altitudes. The photon source region can
be up to 20 miles thick and 100 miles in diameter. As seen in Figure 5 on page 94 and
Figure 6 on page 95. these photons can ionize a significant portion of the atmosphere
potentially covering the entire United States and consequently generating an
electromagnetic pulse (EMP).
Since conventional explosives can generate electromagnetic signals after
explosion, it was predicted that nuclear explosives would generate an electromagnetic
pulse (EMP). However, the dangers of this EMP were not predicted. It was not until
the early 1950s that the malfunction failure of equipment could be attributed to the
EMP. In 1960 the potential hazards ofEMP were recognized as well as possible benefits
such as long range detection of nuclear detonations. When above ground detonation of
nuclear weapons were being performed in the 1960s, some data concerning EMP was
collected. Since this time, below ground detonation . simulators, and computer
simulations have provided most of the information concerning EMP.
In essence, nuclear EMP is no different than any propagating electromagnetic
wave radiation. However, in the EMP there is a very rapid rise to peak current
amplitude on the order of a microsecond and up to 50,000 volts per meter. There is a
subsequent slow decay. The frequency range of the radiation is very broad, from two up
to 100 megahertz. [Ref. 1]
2. Nature and Characteristics of EMP
The strength of the electromagnetic field being radiated is very large but short
lived. As the radiation travels at the speed of light conductors pick up this radiation and
induce currents in them. Obviously the weapon yield and height of burst dictate the
parameters of EMP.
In comparing EMP and lightning, there have been a number of similar qualities
involving use of shielded enclosures, shielding cables, terminal protection, and controlled
grounds. There are however three areas of difference to note which are:
• Depending on lightning ground for EMP protection
• Integrating EMP and lightning terminal protection
• Combatins EMP effects on unique circuits developed for lightning protection. [Ref.
1]
The shields for lightning may be functional against the low frequency of the EMP, but
may not against the high frequency. The faster rise time of the EMP results in a broader
energy spectrum. The EMP is less localized than the lightning and induces high
potential differences whereas the lightning produces high current densities.
3. Fundamentals of Electromagnetic theory
Upon detonation of a nuclear weapon in the atmosphere, the dominant photon
interaction is Compton scattering with the photons having high enough energy to repeat
the Compton process. The free electrons produced travel away from the burst point
creating an electron current. Being that the velocity of electrons is greater than the
velocity of the positive ions, there is a partial charge separation and therefore a radial
electric field. The gamma ray pulse which generates the Compton scattering peaks in
less than one microsecond. As the photons move outward, lower energy free electrons
are generated. These electrons are attracted back toward the burst point because of the
charge separation. This creates a conduction current. The force on the electrons, thus
the magnitude of the current increases as the Compton current increases. Since the
direction of the conduction current is opposite to the direction of the Compton current,
there is a point when the electric field ceases to increase. This point is called
saturation. Obviously saturation occurs sooner near the burst point. If the gamma rays
coming from the burst point form a homogenous uniform circle, then the electric field
will be limited to the area of charge separation and the rays will ionize the medium and
the energy will be degraded into thermal heat. When there is no perfect symmetry, the
ionized sphere is disturbed initiating a non-radial oscillating pulse of electromagnetic
radiation. Much of the energy is in the radiowave frequency. [Ref. 2]
For bursts occurring in the atmosphere there is greater ionization of large
molecules which have a lower mobility. This lower mobility translates into an increased
EMP duration. This longer pulse is expressed by:






where t is time in seconds. Because of the low air density for high altitude bursts the
mobility of total ions is much higher thereby the pulse is shorter and expressed by:
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For lightning the rise to peak amplitude is much longer than for an EMP (see Figure 7
on page 96). By taking the fourier transform of £/t) and E
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Figure S on page 97 shows the decibel equivalents of the long and short pulse. Note
that the higher altitude burst gives a higher decibel equivalent per angular frequency.
For high altitude bursts the upward traveling electrons are captured by the
earth's magnetic field which then emit high frequency jamming synchrotron radiation.
These electrons are called Argus Electrons and recombine slowly because of the very thin
atmosphere at this altitude. The interactions of the electrons in the geomagnetic field
is shown in Figure 9 on page 9S.
Due to the Lorentz force law the electrons move along the geomagnetic field
lines. So the electrons spiral around the geomagnetic field lines toward the mirror point
the magnetic force along the lines opposite to the motion of the approaching electrons.
Thus we have electrons bouncing back and forth between the two mirror points at the
magnetic poles. The period between mirrors takes approximately 0.1 to 1.0 second and
the time to spiral is about one microsecond. The electrons also precess around the earth
in about two to eight hours. The Argus electrons decay via recombination.
reattachment, and other dissipative methods taking days or even weeks. The spiraling
electrons emit a synchrotron type radiation which disrupts and jams radio
communication. [Ref. 3]
The maximum frequency generated from the EMP radiation is determined by
the peak time of the Compton current which is about 10 nanoseconds. Therefore the
maximum frequency would be about 100 megahertz with much of the energy being in
the radio frequency range. As would be expected, the peak time (rise time) is longer at
lower altitudes due to the increased air density, thus the spectrum is shifted toward lower
frequencies. The gamma rays only carry about 0.3% of the explosion energy and only
one part per thousand to one part per 10 million of the 0.3% is radiated in the EMP.
As an example. 4.2x10-" ergs of energy are released from a high altitude one megaton
explosion. The amount radiated as EMP is about 10 1S ergs or 10" joules. It is possible
that as little as one joule of energy received by a collector can damage a device.
4. EMP Pickup and Po^er Flow
The EV1P energy is collected by a variety of conductors as seen in Table 4 on
page 82. In high altitude detonations conductors outside of the source region receive
very little EMP energy per unit area. The electromagnetic waves induce an electrical
current in the conductors which is then carried to the connected equipment. Energy
collection from an EMP depends on the size and shape of the collector, orientation of
the collector, and the frequency spectrum of the pulse. Normally as the dimensions of
the collector increase so does the capacity for energy absorption.
Generally solid state components are more susceptible to the EMP as compared
with the old vacuum tube technology. As seen in Table 5 on page 83, the least
susceptible components are motors, transformers, and circuit breakers. Regarding
protection of equipment against an EMP, already existing equipment is harder to shield
than new equipment with built in hardening. Grounded metal shields block
electromagnetic waves from entering the equipment while surge arrestors divert the peak
current surges. Only people in contact with a collector or close to the point of
detonation would be affected by the EMP radiation.
There are 3 basic modes of EMP energy coupling:
• Electric Induction
• Magnetic Induction
• Resistive Coupling (direct charge deposition).
The electric field component in the direction of the conductor creates a current. The
magnetic field portion of the EMP passing through a closed conducting loop, creates a
current in the loop. If a current is induced in a medium which surrounds another
conductor then, an alternate conducting path is created in the conductor. Above ground
collectors (e.g.. antennas and power lines) are able to receive additional energy from the
radiation reflected from the ground. Also underground conductors can receive EMP
energy by the methods mentioned above. Because the EMP has a very broad frequency




There are unique EMP characteristics associated with the height at which
nuclear detonation occurs. Eor a surface burst, the gamma rays headed downward are
absorbed by the ground thereby creating a net electron current of upward. The gamma
rays not absorbed by the ground go on to produce ionization and a charge separation.
This ionization results in electromagnetic waves in the radio frequency region.
Because the air at the surface is more dense than the upper altitude region, the
strong electric field produced due to the charge separation decreases quite rapidly from
the point of explosion. The radius for maximum EMP effects on equipment range from
two to five miles. For example, a one megaton blast can create an EMP for up to eight
miles.
The flow of electrons from the blast point is greater than the positive ion flow
from the the blast point. Thus the core remains relatively positively charged. The
electrons absorbed by the ground are conducted back to the blast point creating a strong
magnetic field.
Large electromagnetic fields are generated in the ground due to the conduction
current. The peak radiated fields are vastly larger along the earth's direction than for a




where E is the peak field at a distance R from the burst point and E- is the peak radiated
field at a radius R-. R- can be about two-five miles and E- can be manv kilovolts per
meter.
As seen in Figure 10 on page 99, the current returning back to the burst point
via ground conduction produces a toroidal magnetic field. The radial component of the





— — J r (7)
The solution to this equation is:
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The surface burst has 3 phases of development. The first phase is called the
Wave Phase where the displacement current is much larger than the conduction current
giving the equation:
vx/7 = 4L J+-r^T (11 ^c u ct
where o<^\Q-\mhmosjmeter). The second phase is called the Diffusion Phase where the
conduction current dominates over the displacement current. At this point, there is
electric field saturation and the toroidal current loop produces an azimuthal magnetic
field as seen in Figure 10 on page 99. The third phase is called the Quasi-Static Phase
where the diffusion has ceased and the induction component of the electric field is less
than the electrostatic component. At this point the Compton and conduction currents
start to cancel.
The ground reflection from a surface burst significantly contributes to not only
the total impressed field but, also to the affects on above ground cables. The vertical
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With the signing of a United States-Soviet Union treaty banning all middle
range nuclear weapons, the use of short range nuclear weapons in combat scenarios has
become more a reality. These small sophisticated nuclear weapons are capable of not
only generating a significant blast overpressure, but also generating a strong
electromagnetic fields within a mile or so form the point of detonation. This
electromagnetic field is the source of the source region electromagnetic pulse (SREMP).
There is a short and rather accurate computer program that gives information about a
surface region detonation such as electric and magnetic field strength, conductivity, and
Compton current given the weapon yield, range to burst, and surface conductivity. [Ref.
2. Mid Altitude Burst
Medium altitude airbursts are below 19 miles with the deposition region not
touching earth. Because the air closer to the surface of the earth is more dense, the
electron current has a net direction upward. Weapon yield and height of burst plus
weapon asymmetries determine the magnitude of the EMP field radiated. For the low
frequency component of the EMP the electric field radiated is given by:
R
E(r) =-^x£ (r) sin (15)
where R is the radius of the deposition region. £„(t) is the radiated field strength at the
start of radiating region of time t. and is the angle from the observer to a vertical
position above the burst point. Common values for £ (t) are 10-400 volt per meter and
for R are from 3 to 9 miles.
3. Exoatmospheric Burst
For a high altitude burst(i.e., about 19 miles or greater), the gamma rays travel
much farther due to the decreased air density. The gamma rays traveling upward
encounter a decreasing density air while downward rays encounter an increasing density
air. The source region for EMP comes from these gamma rays interacting with the air
molecules. This source region or deposition region gathers about 30 miles from the
earth's surface being about 50 miles thick at the center. The horizontal spread over the
earth's surface is energy yield and height of burst dependent.
As the gamma rays enter the air, Compton electrons are generated. These
Compton electrons are deflected by the earth's magnetic field obeying the Lorentz force
law which is:
10
F = VxB. (16)
The result is the creation of an EV1P moving toward the earth's surface. The time for
the EMP to rise to a peak pulse is less than the time for a surface burst because of the
decreased air density. The shortened peak pulse time creates higher frequency Compton
electrons used in the EMP. Thus, the electromagnetic energy for the high altitude pulse
has a higher frequency. As an example, a nuclear explosion 50 miles above the earth's
surface will create an affected area of 1200 miles in diameter. For a burst of 100 miles
in height the affected area would be 1800 miles in diameter. Because the speed of the
electrons is close to the speed of light and radiation travels at the speed of light, the
entire area us affected simultaneouslv.
-
The Compton electrons in the high altitude burst will follow a curved path line
around the earth emitting synchrotron radiation. The EMP radiates at angles other than
vertical and from the edges. As described in Glasstone [Ref. 1]. because o'i the
conducting properties of the earth's surface, lower frequencies can extend beyond the
horizon because these EM waves are able to follow the curvature of the earth. This
would mean that the outer edge of an EMP would possibly have a signature more like
lightning. Field strengths are on the order of tens of kilovolts per meter for the area
receiving the EMP. The spatial variations in the electric field are a function of the
geomagnetic field. [Ref. 3]
4. System Generated EMP
System-Generated EMP (SGEMP) refers to the electric field that is created due
to the interaction of gamma and x-rays with electronic system. The gamma and x-rays
induce electron forward and back scattering, via the Compton and photoelectric effects,
within the system. They also create external and internal currents. In components with
low gas pressure, very high electric fields can be generated at the surface. With higher
gas pressures the electrons cause gas ionization and in turn release low energy secondary
electrons. These electrons form a current which tend to cancel the electric field present.
The system generated EMP (SGEMP) is also known as the internal EMP
(IEMP) because an EMP is generated by electric currents due to ionization from high
energy photons (e.g.. gamma rays and x-rays) impacting the system. Only in high
altitude bursts do x-rays and gamma rays travel for enough to be of concern. For a
burst welll within the atmosphere, overpressures would be a greater damage threat. The
back and forward scattering of these x-rays and gamma rays interact with electronics
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materials thus generating currents. Therefore spacecraft systems would feel the result
of a SGEMP. However, there SGEMP effects, in some low altitude devices, called
source region EMP (SREMP). The 3 modes by which SGEMP are coupled to the
spacecraft electronics are:
• Replacement currents. The photons hitting the surface cause a nonhomogeneous
electron surface charge density distribution. This imbalance causes induced charge
replacement currents to flow on the outside of the system via electrical and
electronic apertures.
• X-rays penetration of spacecraft skin. This penetration produces electrons on the
interior of the walls which generate cavity electromagnetic fields. These fields
produce voltages associated with spurious currents that can lead to burnout of the
system. -
• X-ray produced electrons injected into cables. These electrons get directly into
signal and power cables again causing spurious currents that burnout the systems.
Shielding measures for cables include solid outer conductor coaxial cables.
Some other means for stifling SGEMP effects include:
back-to-back diodes for spurious voltage clipping
decoupling networks consisting of series resistors and shunt diodes
series inductors and shunt capacitors
minimizing possible ground loops
• using high density packing to reduce cavity fields
• mounting components close to ground planes. [Ref. 3]
5. Electron Caused EMP
Electron caused electromagnetic pulse (ECEMP) is a result of induced transient
fields, voltages, and currents in a spacecraft exposed to natural x-ray amd gamma fluxes
plus a man made space environment as described above for a SGEMP. Printed circuit
boards and cable dielectric act as dielectrics separating space electrons. After a sufficient
buildup, dielectric breakdown occurs resulting in electrical transients entering the system.
Arcing into the system occurs when floating metallization acts like a capacitor collecting
charge. Other types of EMP are discussed in Appendix B.
C. EMP EFFECTS IN COMPONENTS
1. Component Selection
Voltage and current transients are system responses to the EMP and are the
primary cause of damages to the system. The high altitude bursts cause much more
widely spread damage than the lower altitude bursts because of the larce area covered
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as seen in Figure 6 on page 95. The most sensitive device to the EMP transients is the
semiconductor because of their small junction areas hence small volume.
Because of the small thermal time constant of the EMP. there is an adiabatic
type feature in the semiconductor. When the EMP transients approach the device failure
threshold, the junctions in the devices approach its melting temperature and results in a
short circuit also called thermal second breakdown. This is to be distinguished from
Avalanche Breakdown which occurs when the diode device is reverse biased. As it turns
out, the semiconductor thermal parameters are a function of the material temperature.
Some of these thermal parameters include material density, specific heat, heat capacity,
and thermal conductivity.
Low-pass filters are used when hardening for EMP because of the abundant
amount of high frequencies due to the brevity of the pulse. These filters come in a rr or
T configuration. Filters are more beneficial than shields in that they are lighter and last
longer but. they must be properly used. The outside filter housing must have a good
electrical grounding as determined by their design and operation.
A current limiting resistor aids in protecting them against an EMP. They
basically prevent an excess current from being drawn through the base-collector junction
causing breakdown and burnout. By placing this type of resistor in the emitter lead of a
transistor, the device will be protected against the possibility of thermal runaway effects
due to spurious currents.
2. Cables
The imperfections in shielded cables come from incomplete meshed outer
conductor braid and from the cable connectors that are not radio frequency tight. The
EMP energy induces energy on the central conductors of the cable resulting in unwanted
signal currents that possibly can damage the devices to which it is connected. As
described in Messenger [Ref. 3]. the EMP generated electric fields can be large and the
following equations give a hint to the complexity of the EMP effects on cables. The
induced electromagnetic field assumed to be vertically polarized and in terms of cable
parameters is:
E rv =E;.(l-^- 2/A7') (17)
where
E\ = EMP induced incident field amplitude
h = heisht of cable above ground
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i\ = reflection coefficient for a vertically polarized wave
K = propagation number.
The internal cable voltage (V) and current (I) equations are:
V' = IZ=E;V = Zt I (IS)
/'+ YV=-Y
t
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where
primed variables are derivatives with respect to distance along the transmission line
I is total cable ground return current




is corresponding transfer admittance
V„ is shield braid-to-ground voltage
Cn is cable capacitance per unit length
z is cable impedance per unit length
Y is cable admittance per unit length.
Now the general form of the transfer impedance for a braid shield cable is:
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For electrically short (L< < / ) cables, the effectiveness of the shield can be
given as:
S = 201og 10 -^- (25)
r
where
I = outer conductor current
I = center conductor current.
When Y, is small and terminated in impedances Z
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But. when Yt is large and terminated in its characteristic impedance Ze. the electrically
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= inductance per unit length of cable d is the cable burial depth




= magnetic flux pulse
A = cable cross section area in centimeters. [Ref. 3]
D. EMP DAMAGE
1. Coupling
Given a shielded enclosure, the shielding effectiveness as a function of
frequency is:
S£M = -201og 10 {db) (33)
where
E, = the incident electric field
Ew = electric field with the enclosure
co = frequency.
The corresponding equation for the magnetic field is:
SH(cj) = - 20 log ](
H{co)
(34)
By using Gauss's theorem it can be said that £, must vanish in the interior of the housing
for a direct current (dc) electric field. However, the dc magnetic field does penetrate the
enclosure housing. A sinusoidal time dependent £ does penetrate the housing as
described by Maxwell's equations. If the shielding thickness (th) is greater than the
penetration depth (skin depth, S) then the corresponding electric field ratio is:
En {o) <2icoE be <? ]
Ej((i)) ad
(35)
when the radius (b) and thickness (th) are measurements of a spherical shield enclosure.
R is equal to the penetration distance into spherical shell wall.
As stated in Messenger [Ref. 3], the embedded medium is the most significant
contribution to the overall shielding effectiveness. Also, apertures in the shield lower its
effectiveness. It is noted as well that seams in the shielding can become an area for hich
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fields and heat losses due to a higher resistivity in these areas. For a maximum
permeability ^ must be at its maximum where:
2
<"max
= ^~7 • (36)
COOK
There is correspondingly maximum shielding effectiveness for shields with a high
H value. For high ,u there is a quick saturation of magnetization from incident magnetic
field lines after which there is no longer any protection against magnetic fields.
Obviously this problem can be avoided by making the wall sufficiently thick. For time






B, = saturation magnetic flux density
4»ax
= Peak circulating current on shield exterior.




fx I{i)di equal the total collected on the outer surface of the shield. This gives an
indication of the importance that shielding thickness and shielding design can have on
the protection of internal circuitry. [Ref. 3]
2. Telephone and Radio Transmission
In the event o[ an EM P. above ground power lines and telephone lines are
particularly susceptible. Since an EMP has a broad frequency band, the sending and
receiving antennas also would collect EMP energy along the designated band of
frequencies. Before the concern over an E.MP, power lines, telephone lines, and
antennas were protected against lightning by common spark gaps. In antennas the guy
wires carry most of the current to the ground via arcing. Modern spark gap devices
attempt to include standards for EMP as well as for lightning. However, there are some
significant differences between liahtnins and an EMP which merit some discussion. Just
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because a device is adequately protected against lightning does not mean that it is also
EMP protected.
As seen in Figure 11 on page 100. a typical EMP induced current pulse shows
a rapid rise of over 10.000 amperes in less than one microsecond. The decay will last for
about one millisecond. For lightning induced currents in overhead power lines, the peak
current time is longer and the decay persists for a longer period of time. Therefore older
lightning arresters may not be adequate. For unprotected overhead medium and low
voltage power lines, surge voltages could result in insulator flashover. This can cause
poor operation in the breakers in the switching surge. Radio and telephone systems
employ standard measures for hardening such as buried coaxial cables, shielding of audio
wiring, single point grounding, and avoidance of loops.
E. PROTECTION AGAINST EMP
1. Protective Measures
Electrical and electronic components can be rendered temporarily useless such
as the temporary change of state in a flip-flop circuit. This temporary disturbance is
called an Operational Upset. In this situation the energy required is of a few orders of
magnitude smaller than necessary to create a Functional Damage which occurs when
devices or components are burned out thus permanently disallowing the full range of
functions. As seen in Table 6 on page 84, semiconductors are much more vulnerable
to EMP than vacuum tubes. Also the sensitivity of certain electrical components depend
on the circuit characteristics, on the nature of the semiconductor material, and the make
up of the solid state device. Obviously the sensitivity of the system and the effectiveness
of the collector help in determining the seriousness of the EMP threat. But in analyzing
the sensitivity of a system or component to EMP involve not only the amount of energy
collected but also, operational upset and damage mechanism previously discussed.
Assuming that all EMP collectors are basically similar, Table 6 on page 84 gives a
breakdown of EMP susceptibility on electronics.
In determining the vulnerability of a system to EMP, the very first thing to do
is to gather information concerning its components as to their worst case exposure
results and susceptibility. Problem areas can then be identified, analyzed, and then
finally tested.
Some general methods of hardening systems against EMP include:
• Shielding
• Proper Circuit Layout
• Satisfactory Grounding
• Protective Devices.
Also as seen in Table 6 on page S4 and Table 15 on page 90. the type of component
used to design the system plays a vital role in EMP hardening (i.e., vacuum tubes versus
semiconductors). Shielding involves the hindering of electromagnetic waves by highly
conductive type metals (e.g., copper.iron. etc.). Individual shielding of each
components proves to be very expensive and burdensome. Therefore hardening involves
a continuous thick sheet or multiple thin sheets around the entire system. Care should
be taken to limit the number and size of the apertures. Necessary apertures should be
protected by special screens or waveguides. Also since running cables and wires can
carry an induced current from EMP. they also must be protected.
Proper circuit layout would include avoiding loop layouts that would be an area
for the strong magnetic field to induce a rather strong current. Other layout areas
include use of common ground points, twisted cable pairs, system and intrasystem
wiring. Cable design represents a mixture of shielding and circuit design measures in
EMP protection. In addition, it is best to have cables deeply buried, have good junction
box contacts, and have continuity of the shield layer at splices.
Without good grounding, the high peak current induced by an EMP could
severely damage the system. The key is to have a relatively low impedance to the local
earth surface. In addition to grounding there are other sundry ways of protecting a
device. Some examples of these measures include spark gaps, arresters, low and high
band pass filters, amplitude limiters. circuit breakers, and fuses. The type and particular
usage of a device would determine which of these measures to be appropriate. On a
smaller integrated solid state level such measures include diodes, nonlinear resistors, and
silicon-controlled rectifier clamps.
In the infancy of the EMP program, specifications and standards for the
hardening of systems were being explored. Hardening design had to be flexible enough
to cover any present or future systems plus optimization criteria had to be drawn up for
system engineering to follow involving:
• minimum initial cost
• minimum weight
• minimum Life Cycle Cost (LCC)
minimum disruption of current operations•
• maximum flexibility
• all of the above. [Ref. 5: p. SS]
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In optimization of a hardening design, the bad attributes must be minimized and
the good ones maximized (see Table 7 on page 84 ). These attributes can be categorized
and quantified by use of a Figure of Merit (FOM), where FOM is equal to parameter
benefits divided by parameter penalties [Ref. 6]. The major alternatives in EMP
hardening include (1) shielding. (2) electrical pin protection, or (3) combination of the
above. When the optimization criteria are considered, there is a fair amount of
information to conclude that primary hardening should come from shielding (see
Table 8 on page 85). [Ref. 5]
In most electronic devices, wire cables are used to connect the various systems.
These wire cables become an obviously vulnerable source for EMP induced high
amplitude voltages of short duration called transients. There is a method for protecting
these wire cables from transients of any source. The Transient Protected Connector
(TPC) is a device that:
• provides protection as an integral part of the envelope
• does not alter the connector envelope
• is transparent to the system
• does not significantly alter the weight. [Ref. 7]
At normal voltages the voltage variable material in the TPC, which is connected to the
ground, maintains a very high resistance. When a transient hits, the voltage obviously
increases and the resistance dramatically decreases as seen in Figure 12 on page 101.
thus providing preferable ground pathway and protecting the system and device.
One problem that arises is whether the protective systems in place degrade over
a period of time. The combination of an electromagnetic suppression filter with an
electric surge arrester (ESA) system does degrade. The breakdown occurred at
increasing voltage levels when measured for different years. This means that over time,
the amount of voltage admitted increases on the suppression filter will increase due to
a decrease performance of the ESA. As voltage increases on the suppression filter, the
amount of EMP protection for the system will decrease. [Ref. S]
2. Testing
Since atmospheric nuclear weapons testing is no longer done, other less direct
methods have had to be devised to test systems for EMP hardening. Generation of an
artificial EMP and computer simulations have become very common methods of
evaluating the reliability of systems against an EMP. It is expected that testing systems
20
will reveal unexpected effects such as weaknesses or coupling. Nonlinear effects
normally can be revealed by testing. The classes of EMP testing include:
• Low-level current mapping
• High-level current injection
• High-level electromagnetic fields.
Low-level current is used to indicate the magnitudes and signatures on internal cables
giving the testers a starting point in system evaluation. High-level currents can help
uncover nonlinearities in the system. The high-level electromagnetic field testing is the
final test most closely approximating in vivo conditions.
In the tests there are two types of excitation being (1) waveform simulations
providing time domain information and (2) continuous wave (CW) signals providing
frequency domain information. In order to test to the electronic threshold waveform,
time domain information is necessary. In matching a system to a frequency range,
analysis in the frequency domain CW signals is required. The large scale simulators use
the 2 types of excitation with pulse generators operating in the time domain. The pulse
generator can produce a low level repetitive shot or a high level single shot. As a note,
electromagnetic scale modeling appears to be useful to the measurement of external
fields, voltages, and currents. Internal field quantities are harder to come by. Some
important simulators are discussed in Appendix C.
One method of simulating EMP employs a large parallel plate system generating
a maximum amplitude of 100 kilovolt per meter with a rise time of 10 nanoseconds. In
this arrangement small and medium size objects can be completely irradiated at realistic
amplitudes. [Ref. 9]
Also, in experiments the use of fiber optics in measuring shield effectiveness for
a high altitude EMP. have improved the accuracy of such measurements. By mounting
the magnetic field sensor on a fiber optic cylinder, the amplitude of the EMP was
enhanced. Some of the advantages of the fiber optic cylinder include:
• elimination of signal cable coupling
• protection of electronic devices used in field data collection. [Ref. 10]
However vibration, corrosion, aging, improper maintenance, and modifications
can cause the shielding effectiveness to be compromised. The Defense Nuclear Agency
(DNA) continuous wave (CW) Measurement System is used to test the electromagnetic
response of systems. The 3 functions in shielding performance are:
• excitation of the system
• observation of the system response
• interpretation of the observed response. [Ref. 11]
The CW system is portable, repeatable. automated, and gives real time data processing.
Flexibility in tailoring testing to specific system requirements and flexibility in providing
the type of electromagnetic excitation of potential gradients makes it a powerful tool for
shield testing.
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III. HAZARDS OF ELECTROMAGNETIC RADIATION TO ORDNANCE
(HERO)
A. INTRODUCTION
The HERO program's existence and continuation is established by OPNAVINST
8023.2c dated 19 June 1981. Within this program, the Navy Explosive Safety Program
receives policy, requirements, and procedures. The HERO programs official Navy
point-of-contact is the Naval Sea Systems Command. They act as the principal
coordinator between the HERO Program and the Naval System Commanders plus they
must resolve all electromagnetic radiation hazards affecting ordnance. The instruction
governing the Naval Sea System Commands role is in NAVSEAINST 8020.7B dated 25
August 1987. Other instructions providing technical guidance for the HERO program
are MIL-STD-1385B dated 1 August 19S6. NAVSEA OD 3095 dated 1 September 1974,
and NAVSEA OP 3565 dated 1 May 1987. [Ref. 12 and 13]
In paragraph 4 of NAVSEAINST 8020.7B the scope of the HERO program is
quoted as follows:
a. The HERO program shall establish and implement HERO explosives
safety standards, criteria, instructions, regulations.and electromagnetic
emission (EMCON) regulations throughout the Department of the Navy
in accordance with the organization and general responsibilities assigned
by reference (a).
b. This instruction applies to programs involving weapon systems for surface
ships, submarines, aircraft, and installations.
c. The HERO program includes nuclear and conventional electrically
initiated weapons such as: gun systems, missile systems, bombs, flares,
powered targets, depth charges, mines, torpedoes, and other items that
contain EED's (e.g.. cable cutters, chaff, and munitions dispensers, self
destruct devices . fire extinguishers, etc....). In application, this
instruction applies to operations and equipment utilized in assembling.
packaging, processing, stowage, handling, and testing plus the disposal
of weapons and launching systems which contain EED's.
d. This instruction is also applicable to EMR emitters being developed or
modified for use in areas adjacent to the deployed Navy Weapon Systems.
e. This instruction implements and is part of the Weapons System Safety
and Explosives Safety Programs. [Ref. 14]
In addition to the definition outlined above, some of the responsibilities included in the
HERO program are as follows:
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Proposes changes to future weapons development to ensure safety from
electromagnetic radiation (EMR)
Vlaintains procedures for HERO certification
Tests for HERO certification on platforms (e.g., ships, etc..)
Certifies whether a particular weapon is safe or not in a particular platform
environment
• Maintains files of HERO certification of all Navy Weapon Systems.
• Inspects transmitting and receiving antenna installations to avoid any possible
HERO problem
• Maintains NAVSEA OP-3565. [Ref. 15: p. 1-5]
Within the HERO program ordnance is labeled safe, unsafe, or susceptible and
under what conditions is that ordnance safe, unsafe, or susceptible. This means any
restrictions necessary to make that ordnance safe must be spelled out clearly. These
restrictions may involve special movement and handling procedures detailing the limited
operation of EMR generating devices within the local area. These restrictions may be
incorporated in the HERO EMCOX bills of restrictions for ship and shore commands.
HERO testing, EMV testing, the missile E? program, and the Electronic System
Effects program are all supported by the NSWC, Dahlgren, Virginia. Some of the
facilities include a ground plane, mode-stirred chamber, anechoic chamber, and the
transmitters. The EMV program started in the early 1970's.
1. Pre-HERO Program/History
As early as the 15th century specific hazards were associated with artillery and
precautionary measures were taken. It has only been since the early 1960's that there
has been a standard accident format to report unexplained accidents that could have
been caused by RF emissions. A brief history of Hero and EEDs is seen in Appendix
D.
In the late 1 SCO's, Michael Faraday and Heinrich Hertz demonstrated that
EMR can induce a current in conducting wires. Also in the second half of the 19th
century a British citizen, Alfred Nobel, patented the electric blasting cap It has been
RF and EED technologies that have created the HERO program. The connection
between these two technologies was not suspected until World War II. It was
recognized that certain accidents and machinery reliability problems were being caused
by an induced current in the wires leading to that ordnance's EEDs. The unshielded
conductors, personnel, and tools were acting as an antenna conveying the induced
current.
24
Modern ships are no longer made of wood (except Mine Sweepers) but of metal
which has a good ground in the ocean. Since the introduction of radios and then later
radar, the ships have been an increasing source of EMR and expectantly produces an
interference problem. There is mutual interference between communication equipment
as well as between radars and electronic wave equipment as well as between individual
radars. In recent years, the radiation power levels of the radar, particularly in the form
of phased-array radar (e.g.. AN SPY- 1). have increased and will continue to complicate
the EME picture even more. As will be discussed later these increases in the radiated
power levels will cause retesting and re-certifying of the EEDs and weapon systems
respectively. The HERO program's task of investigation of potential HERO problems,
prevention of EMI problems, and suggested controls on electromagnetic emissions
becomes increasingly important as technology provides more equipment for shipboard
use.
As part of the testing of EEDs. a device had to be found that could convert the
heat of the bridgewire to a measurable electric current. After a contract period from 15
March 1956 to 30 November 1960. by what is now the Naval Surface Warfare Center
(NSWC) with the Denver Research Institute (DRI), the thermocouple proved to be the
most promising sensor.
2. Regulation Guidance
In order to avoid HERO problems in new weapon systems and ordnance in
1961. the HERO program was directed to provide guidance to manufactures of weapons
in the early stages of development in order to design out HERO accentuating conditions.
There were two objectives in mind:
• provide timely HERO information to weapons developers
• provide an environment whereby weapons developers can bring problems to the
HERO program staff.
The problem solving team consisted of HERO experts from:
• NAVAL WEAPONS LABORATORY (NWL)
• NAVAL ORDNANCE LABORATORY WHITE OAK (NOL/WO)
• NAVAL DEVELOPMENT CENTER JOHNSVILLE (NADC/J)
• NAVAL ORDNANCE TEST STATION (NOTS)
• NAVAL ORDNANCE LABORATORY CORONA(NOL C).
The background of this problem solving team were areas such as proximity pulsed radar
technology, physics, electrical engineering, cameras, transmitters, and radio receivers.
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3. Methodology
If current operation procedures aboard a vessel do not meet HERO standards
regarding use of weapon systems, RF radiating equipment, or handling of ordnance,
then either an administrative fix or a physical fix would be needed. A physical fix would
consist of using hardening technology such as shields and filters in order to reduce the
amount of hazardous RF induced current. An administrative fix might consist of the
following type of measures:
• controlling RF emissions during critical ordnance handling operations
• stipulation of safe handling distances
• modification of a critical ordnance handling operation. [Ref. 15]
Appendix E clearly shows the trends toward an increased number of frequencies and
increase power density in the communications and radar type equipment. [Ref. 16]
As a result of the increased frequency range and greater power density there was
a need to reevaluate the HERO status of previously tested weapons systems. What the
HERO program testing personnel did was to extrapolate from valid data by multiplying
the known 15% MXFC by a scaling factor. This scaling factor was the ratio of current
power density to power density at test time. As might be expected there was considerable
engineering judgment and worst case scenarios were always considered when determining
a safe level. By increasing the field intensity of the 2-32 MHz HF band from 100 V M
to 200 V M, the testing personnel had to also reevaluate the ordnance handling and
loading procedures. There are two possible solutions to this problem:
• retest and reclassify all systems at the 200 V/M field strength
• modify the general HERO requirements of ordnance separation distance from an
HF antenna. [Ref. 15]
4. Design and Inspections
Some possible solutions to the HERO problem are:
• eliminate all EEDs
• physical separation of all EED ordnance from an EME
• remove or turn off all EME generating equipment when EED ordnance is presented
• harden all EEDs and components in ordnance. [Ref. 17]
The most popular solution by the fleet is hardening and appears to be the most feasible
long range answer. As discussed in the hardening chapter the proper use of filters,
shielding, and circuit layout can adequately protect a system.
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Since 1962 designs and standards for the RF environment were determined and
put into instructions and reports to be used by ship and shore communities. Table 9
on page S5 and Table 10 on page 86 show the initial environmental conditions to be
used by ship and shore activities in protecting ordnance. It was not until 1964 that RF
environmental criteria information became a military specification carrying more
authority than the previous articles, but yet containing the same environmental
information. This new specification dictated that a weapon enclosure shall attenuate
RF energy at least 60 db from 1 MHz to 20 MHz [Ref. 18]. Along with this information
susceptibility curves can be generated as seen in Figure 13 on page 102 and in
Figure 14 on page 103. They provide information for field strength and power density
for all interested parties (e.g., weapons officer, and weapons designers). By 1965 the first
edition of reference 29 was produced in order to fully incorporate design guidelines and
principles for weapons designers and testers in order to meet HERO standards and
requirements.
As communication equipment and radar began to require greater power and
frequency usage, the HERO program had to reject this trend in their testing and
standards. A new military instruction reflected this change when MIL-STD-1385
replaced MIL-D-24014 on 6 April 1972 [Ref. 16], Appendix E gives a table for the 1972
EME levels. Not too many years after this new instruction, the upgrade of reference 29
was released also giving updated susceptibility curves. These curves give information for
single component level EED and also hazard levels for fully assembled weapons during
loading and handling. These new updated graphs are shown in Appendix G.
B. THERMOCOUPLE
The Denver Research Institute (DRI) was contracted to develop a sensor which
could measure the heat generated in the bridgewire of the EED from RF energy induced
currents. Bismuth and Tellurium were the most sensitive thermocouple materials. But.
Tellurium was too hard to deposit on thin films and a Bismuth-Tellurium mixture had
problems such as high impedance, fast aging, and electronic drift. All of these made it
very difficult to properly calibrate the Bi-Te mixture. The final selection was a
Bismuth-Antimony combination which does not have the same problems as the Bi-Te
thermocouple also the Bi-Sb has a sufficient sensitivity. Table 1 1 on page 87 gives a
brief summary of DRFs work in this area.
Where these thermocouples are used determine, to some extent, the thermocouple's
desirable qualities. In field testing these sensors are used to indicate the joule heating
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in bridgeware of EEDs in a particular missile or rocket on a particular platform so as to
determine the actual degree of hazard to ordnance. In laboratory testing thermocouples
are used to indicate joule heating in bridgeware of EEDs in order to study the method
of RF power transfer. The requirements for field testing sensors are:
• be sensitive enough to detect bridgeware temperature rises which are small
compared to the ambient temperature
• be compatible with miniature portable equipment
• are expendable and required in large quantities leading to lowest and easy
fabrication.
Also, the requirements for laboratory testing sensors are:
• should be capable of detecting very small amounts of power dissipated in the
bridgewire in order to determine RF coupling
• could involve large and complex equipment
• are not expendable and required in small quantities.
As noted in Table 1 1 on page S7, vacuum deposited thermocouples are lower
ranked than others, but are the most practical sensors overall. Also toroidal coil, PEM.
and wire thermocouples do not significantly hinder its performance. Only small
variations in thermocouple resistance and output are caused by humidity and after 100
days 90° o of the thermocouples had changed less than two ohms. These results are for
thermocouples that contain silver ink connections. Thermocouples are made according
to the following process:
• fabricate a mechanical mold
• pour base materials into one mold and allow to harden
• machine this hardened base and apply a Mylar substrate
• apply layers of Bi-Sb
• apply RF shielding
• calibrate assembly (i.e., thermocouple plus inert EED).
The Bi-Sb vacuum deposited thermocouple invented in the early 1960;s continues to
be the EED of choice. More powerful and efficient vacuum pumps that have aided to
create a better environment to deposit a metallic thin film, have increased the capacity
of production. Other techniques, (e.g., the use of Mylar to reduce the thickness and
reduced the width by a factor of 10) have greatly improved the response time and
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sensitivity of the thermocouples. Currently the specifications of the thermocouples
produced at NSWC, Dahlgren are:
Sensitivity 90-100 V/°C
Response Time 20-35 ms
Resistance 4-20 Q.
By experimentation the group at NSWC, Dahlgren discovered that if a thermocouple is
aligned at 45° in a plane normal to the EED bridgewire, there is a maximum response
time and sensitive [Ref. 15]. This same group noted that in situations where a
thermocouple could not be placed, the use of temperature sensitive chemical substances
(e.g., beeswax) could be used to sense the bridgewire heat. The temperature range could
be from 100°F up to as much as 3200° F with a 3-7°F sensitivity. [Ref. 15]
C. GROUND PLANE TRANSMITTER
The ground plane serves as the shore testing area located as NSWC, Dahlgren, VA.
It measures 400 feet by 100 feet covered by 14 inch weld steel plates. Connected long
copper rods were drawn into the ground to accurately measure the ground potential.
Transmitters were needed to generate the RF environment and the first ones used in
1961 are described in Table 11 on page 87. In the space of less than one year, band
specific transmitters were allowed to be used, in addition to the ground plane
transmitters, as also seen in Table 11 on page 87. [Ref. 15]
As seen in Table 13 on page 89, the ground plane provided an increased capability
of frequency and power output over the years. Also some of these transmitters are
portable in order to provide dockside testing of ships [Ref. 15]. Table 14 on page 89
shows the improvement in the type and quality of the ground plane transmitters since
1972.
The Bruceton sensitivity test is used at a particular frequency by the HERO group
in testing EEDs for mean, all fire and no fire stimuli levels. These levels are defined as
follows:
• Mean-Stimulus Level- the level that will produce a function response 50% of the
time
• All-Fire Stimulus Level- the lowest level that will consistently produce a function
response
• No-Fire Stimulus Level- the highest level that will consistently fail to produce a
function response. [Ref. 19]
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Some of the stimuli associated with EEDs are (1) constant current; (2) constant voltages:
and (3) capacitor discharge energies. In this type of test the estimated mean and
standard deviation are both used to derive more accurate ones. The more accurate \i
and g are then used to determine the all-fire, mean and no fire levels. This method is
very similar to the one-shot method.
Before the test takes place, the distribution of stimulus levels are logarithmically
spaced to ensure a gaussian distribution. However, an estimated n and a are used to set
up the range of levels to run the test with the step size increase equaling to a. After the
test a new /j. and a are produced.
If a mean firing level is known, it should be used to determine a preliminary a. If
it is not available, a single device should be stimulated at a no fire stimulus level and
increased until the device fires. Numerous trials on one device should be avoided in
order not to obscure results through repeated use of the same device because of
desensitization. This method assumes that the voltage and current levels are constant
and have a running length from milliseconds to seconds while capacitor discharging
should last about one second. According to reference 39, the estimated a should be from
0.01 to 0.025 logarithmic units for the capacitor discharge, constant current, and
constant voltage tests. As stated before, the a becomes the step increase for the test.
The preliminary Bruceton test run uses 20 devices and should occur at room
temperature. The 20 devices and should be a random sample (i.e., preferably not all of
them should come from the same lot). Starting at the mean firing stimulus, the first
device should be tested and each time a device does not function the firing stimulus level
should be raised by a for the next device and vice versa each time a device does function.
Upon completion the test should not have covered less than two levels by not more than
six otherwise adjustments must be made. From this preliminary run a new n and a can
be determined and another 50-100 runs can be made with the new values. The a can
then be adjusted to ensure that 10% of the runs occur equally at the extremes. From
this main Bruceton test another set of /j. and o can be determined which determine the
all fire and no fire levels for the devices which are 99.9% and 0.1% respectively. By
using 100 devices in the main test a 95% confidence level is assured. The % firing level
equations are:
99. 9?^ Firing Level =x (mean) + 3.09a
00.1?; Firing Level =x (mean) - 3.09<j.
°Ref. 19
30
The ground plane was built to simulate shipboard EME. It consisted of steel plates
and built over an airplane parking area. Test transmitters were mobile vans with
shipboard antennas. It provides a flexible, cost savings, and more accurate testing
method than does fielding testing. Field testing of ordnance for HERO created
interruptions of shipboard operations along with man power. Also the testing power
levels for HERO were hazardous to shipboard transmitters. Therefore the ground
facility at NSWC, Dahlgren has proven to be more effective than field testing. [Ref. 15]
D. ELECTROMAGNETIC ENVIRONMENT (EME)
1. Power Levels
The power in the EME is a factor of:
• power radiated from the source
• distance of ordnance from the source
• source antenna gain.
For the time being the radiation source is considered isotropic in free space, therefore
the power density (PA ) is proportional to the average power in watts (IVA ) and inversely




If the source is not isotropic but exhibits a specific directional gain, the right side of the
above equation would be multiplied by the source (or transmitting) antenna gain G T .
For a far field the power density equals the square of the electric field strength divided
by the intrinsic impedance 1207: or:
£=19A/P7 (40)
where the electric field is measured in volts per meter and
P sub A = left .Ibrack < \V over m sup 2 > right .rbrack .




showing a prefered direction of gain. Now if G T = 1.64 (for a dipole) then:
7.01E =^-JWT . (42)
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By redefining gain in terms of decibels (dB):




The susceptibility curves seen in Appendix G have had to take into account
pulse modulated radar as opposed to a CW or doppler system. In this pulse modulated
environment the ratio between the average power (WA) and the peak power (PP) is an
important parameter called the Duty Ratio (DR) where
DR = ~jL (45)
also
DR = pulse width x pulse rate = xfr. (46)
Given the peak power and duty ratio the WA can be determined where:
PPxWA = PpxDR = PPxfr = -j- (47)
and
T = —r- = pulse repetition time. (48)
These relationships are graphically illustrated in Figure 15 on page 104.
2. Antennas
When discussing shipboard antennas there are two basic types:
• large radiators
• small radiators.
Large radiators are characterized by a large antenna length to transmitted frequency
ratio (i.e., greater than one) whereas small radiators have a ratio less than one. The
half-wave dipole antenna is an example of a small radiator as seen in Figure 16 on page
104. Most of the large radiators have a dish and is represented in Figure 17 on page
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105. Note the much higher gain over isotropic for the reflector antenna. The reflector
design allows for the alteration of the phase and amplitude in order to focus the
radiation. Measurements of the field strength aboard a particular platform (e.g., an
aircraft carrier) can only be measured for Fraunhofer or far field regions. A Fraunhofer
region or Fraunhofer diffraction occurs when the wave from a source (e.g., an antenna)
appears as a parallel wave [Ref. 20]. Figure 18 on page 105 shows the typical field
strength contour of a carrier deck and illustrate how difficult and irregular the
measurements can be. The near field or Fresnel region obviously start at the source up
until the start of the far field or Fraunhofer region. Because of the relatively short near
field distance, it does not come into play regarding HERO issues unless the ordnance is
right upon the radiating source.
3. Electromagnetic Energy Transfer
The amount of energy received by an object depends on the amount of area
available for reception times the power density in the location of the receiver. Now the
available or effective area is given by:
A,„=^fn (49)
where
). = wave length in meters = 300 frequency in MHz
GR = gain of receiving antenna.




W = —B-L—d_. (M)K An
These equations assume an impedance and load matching as well as a maximum
effective area available. In order to determine the current in say a bridgewire. just relate





These equations give a worst case scenario and assume:
• no shielding of radiation
• no filtering of radiation
• no losses due to load impedance mismatches
• no losses due to resistance in transmission lines or atmosphere.
As seen in Figure 19 on page 106 there are several ways in which an ordnance could
function as a receiving antenna. Also platforms such as aircraft and ships have even
more ways as acting as receiving antennas wThich includes human personnel.
In summary, the HERO program is a specialized area of electromagnetic
vulnerability involving the EED within ordnance. Being that EEDs are in many types
of mechanical systems, the HERO programs can be generalized to cover any mechanical
systems involving EEDs. Electromagnetic fields of known power, frequency, and duty
factor for various types of radar and time domains (i.e., from CW to pulsed excitation)
are the generating sources for the HERO effect as discussed in sections A and B. Section
C shows how these sources are artificially induced to quantify and analyze thus setting
safety and reliability standards. In discussing the actual operational environment section
D gives a clear picture of the transfer mechanisms and its variables from source to the





In some cases knowing the maximum level of shielding protection that a metal
can provide would be useful. Kunkel [Ref. 21] has developed an equation to calculate
the shielding effectiveness (SE) that can be used on a hand held calculator. This
equation could not be used for evaluating an actual shield because some of its
assumptions are that (1) the barrier is infinite in size, (2) the barrier is flat, and (3) the
barrier is homogenous:






reflection loss {db) (54)
A\k\
A = 8.6S6 ad absorption loss (db) (55)







Carrier ' *™ l>] ^
ZwaVe- —fiTllnr, ir < "T~~ ) high impedance source (58)
Z - +j3772nr, (r < -£- ) low impedance source (59)





d = thickness of barrier (meters)
r = distance from source to barrier (meters)
to = Irtf (62)
(j. = (absolute ) permeability of barrier
a - (absolute) conductivity of barrier
;.
< 2*J0l. (63)
Most shielding rooms are made of heavy-gauge magnetic steels. The American
Society of Testing Materials (ASTM) is drawing up standards for the testing of lighter
weight materials as of 1984. There are many techniques for measuring the shielding
effectiveness of enclosures. Some of these techniques of shielding effectiveness are
investigated and the advantages and disadvantages are spelled out. Some of the methods
involve the use of adjoining transverse Electromagnetic (TEM) cells and a time domain
receiver system [Ref. 22]. In conclusion, shielding can be outlined as follows:
• For magnetic fields, only magnetic material can be used for shields at low
frequencies
• For electric fields, materials with high a are adequate for shields
• For plane waves, materials with high a are adequate for shields (both magnetic and
electric fields)
• For any given material, a greater shield thickness is required for magnetic fields
than for electric fields
• For any given material, a greater shield thickness is required for low frequencies
than for high frequencies
• For high frequencies absorption losses become important therefore, to maintain the
shielding effectiveness, all openings must be closed. [Ref. 17: p. 41]
2. Cables
Copper and nickel are the materials aptly suited to shield cables. A single
braided cable gives 50 to 80 decibels (db) of protection over the EMP spectrum whereas
the double braided gives 70 to 100 db and the solid conduit provides more than 1 10 db
of protection.
The EMP response is being used to specify shielded cable and is a figure of merit
(FOM). This FOM combines the frequency content of an EMP with the frequency
dependence of the transfer impedance of the cable shield and then integrate over the
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frequency domain. The EMP response FOM specificaton is 60 db. Given this
specification cable designers should design cable shields with less than one milliohm per
meter of resistance and less than 200 picohenries per meter of inductance. [Rcf. 23]
3. Apertures
Apertures in a shield of nearly any size can be penetrated by electromagnetic
waves induced in an EMP. One example of this phenomena exist in braided coaxial
cable. The length of the cable determines the induced current levels. Mathematical
formulas are used to calculate the load currents of fixed length coaxial cables. [Ref. 24]
Hardening techniques for points of entry are shown in figures Figure 20 on
page 107 and Figure 21 on page 108.
4. Circuit Design
Circuit hardening techniques are shown in Figure 22 on page 109 and
Figure 23 on page 109.
5. Antennas and Filters
Figure 24 on page 110 and Figure 25 on page 110 show techniques for
protecting antennas from the EMP signal.
B. HARDENING DESIGN
1. Allocation
it is unrealistic to expect complete protection of military ships and aircraft from
any type of EMP or HERO. Two questions arise when discussing protection against
EMP:
• What amount of protection needed?
• How do you allocate protection to various systems?
The fundamental approaches in protecting a system or circuit from outside sources are:
• eliminate the source
• eliminate the circuit
• separate the source from the circuit
• electromagnetically shield either the source or the circuit. [Ref. 25]
Obviously shielding the circuit is the most feasible option. Electromagnetic waves can
enter the circuit area via aperture and penetrating conductors (i.e.. wires leading to and
from the circuit) despite the presence of a metal shield being present. It is also obvious
that this outer shield be the outer shell of the aircraft or ship, but this is insufficient
protection from EMP as noted in Figure 26 on page 111. Another level of shielding
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covering specific EM sensitive systems/circuits. Protection is sufficient when external
EMP stresses are no longer the dominant stress. When system generated stress is more
significant than the external EMP, system protection from the external EMP can be
classified as sufficient. These internal stresses are created by power switching,
rectification, relay coils, solenoids, etc... (see Figure 26 on page 111).
2. Margins
One equation to designate EMP hardness margins (EHM) is:








= current needed to damage a device
ISflc = maximum current level at the device interface.
A margin of 10 decibels is considered satisfactory.
3. Component Selection
The surface currents generated by an E.V1P can be up to 30,000 amps of many
microseconds duration. There are two types of disturbances that an EMP can cause (1)
transient upset, and (2) burnout. Both of these are due to spurious currents. Transient
upset requires less current than burnout and can trigger flip-flops which cause high speed
computer malfunction. Permanent damage is caused by burnout which is seen as
overheating and voltage breakdown which leads to arcing carbuerization.
In order to effectively harden components, it is necessary to give them low pass
filter characteristics in order to shunt the bulk high frequency portion of the pulse. Some
guidelines given to consider include:
• Bipolar devices with a large threshold failure per unit area (Wunsch-Bcll constant)
should be used
• Lone switching times should be used for maximum rise times and storage times
Components should have a high junction capacitance
Use additional input and output shunts and integrating capacitance in order to
slow circuit response.
The most susceptible devices to EMP are microwave diodes, transistors, and integrated
circuits. Table 15 on page 90 gives the relationship between type of device and failure
encrgv for some common devices.
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In semiconductors studies discussed in reference (2), it has been discovered that
diode or transistor junction devices can withstand a very large, short duration power
pulse surge. This is in contrast to its continuous service rating. Also the shorter the
EMP pulse duration, the greater the peak power that is able to be withstood. These
studies assume a rectangular pulse using the Wuncsh-Bell model given by:
where
Pf = failure power threshold of the device (kW)
A = junction power threshold of the device cm2
t{
= duration of rectangular EMP (microseconds)
K = damage constant kW(fxs) ll2lcm2 .
Table 16 on page 90 provides some guidelines for picking a damage constant.
The design of ship and aircraft systems is beginning to include the EMP
problem. The design procedure includes a computer-aided interactive process involving
computational and experimental techniques. The EMP algorithm parallels the
Electromagnetic Compatibility design approach in exterior radio frequency
communication system design. Hazardous Electromagnetic Radiation Effects on
Ordnance (HERO) and EMP have a common relationship in that both require hardness
design (e.g.. filters and shielding) but the type of filters and shielding is quite different.
[Ref. 24]
4. Methods
When selecting components to build a particular device there are some circuit
hardness measures to consider. Components are chosen for:
• a minimum ionizing radiation response via low circuit impedance
• fast recovery times
• a minimum permanent damage.
Some sorts of time delay methods (e.g., relays, magnetic cores, and certain radiation
insensitive tunnel diodes) can be useful in circuit hardening.





• Hardening of computer memories
• Hardening of microprocessors and computers.
Reset involves being able to restart an electronic device or system after it has
malfunctioned possibly due to and EM P. Redundancy is simply to supply backup
systems in case the main systems are brought down by radiation. One problem with this
method is cost and therefore allocation of redundancy in electronic systems. Should you
duplicate units within a system or the entire system? Figure 27 on page 1 1 1 shows that
unit duplicity gives a higher reliability. Circumvention is an electronic process whereby
the system goes into a standby mode when the incident nuclear pulse amplitude goes
above the logic upset level. As seen in Figure 28 on page 112. the radiation detector
must cause the inhibit logic to freeze the computer memory store before the pulse
amplitude causes upset or damage. In particular, the incident radiation can cause
memory modification of any memory word being accessed by the central processing unit
at the time of radiation impact upon the system. Protection of computer memories and
microprocessors is accomplished by selecting radiation resistant semiconductor devices
such as bipolar logic devices and a combination of the above methods.
For shielding effectiveness testing, typically a two-port drive circuit technique
is used. This method involves a signal generator applying a signal at one side of the
shield and a detector measures the amount of signal leaking across the shield. This
would also apply to radiated fields. The two-port method has some problems which can
affect the reliability of the measure of shield effectiveness by:
• Most two-port measurements do not completely characterize the shield
• Voltage at one end of the sense line is not equal to the voltage at the other end
• Results of the two-port method do not scale linearly with length.
The four-port drive circuit technique takes into account that the voltage at one
end of the sense circuit is not the same at the other end. Also with the drive signal being
applied at one end of the cable shield, the far end terminates with some load. If as seen
in Figure 29 on page 112, the impedances at each end of the drive and sense circuit are
not the same, then errors will result. [Ref. 26: p. 85] The advantages of the four-port
method include:
• far end and near end leakage can be measured
• shield leakage results scale linearly with length
• allows shield leakage measurements to be compensated for any set of impedances
on the drive and sense lines. [Ref. 26: p. S4]
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In the HERO program hardening of ordnance and weapons systems is
complicated by having to deal with (1) ordnance currently deployed in the fleet but.
improperly protected; (2) the need for increased flexibility in fleet operations; and (3)
ordnance designers and manufactures attempting to deliver weapon systems and
ordnance quickly and at a low cost to themselves. In hardening an ordnance already
deployed involves part science and part creative art in order to protect it yet keeping its
effectiveness. Figure 30 on page 113 shows some proper and improper methods for
hardening and Table 17 on page 91 gives information on shielding materials.
5. Grounding
For ground based facilities an effective method for reducing the level of an EMP
current entering the facility is to provide additional paths to drain the energy before it
enters the building via grounded external collectors. It is the long external power lines
providing the major threat to sensitive equipment inside. One solution is to locate the
power line ground entrance away from the building plus shielding and grounding the
transformer. Some conclusions from research are:
• For power line lengths up to 50 meters, there is a direct relationship between line
length and induced current and beyond 50 meters less of an effect
• Multiple grounds give only a secondary effect of EMP pickup by overhead power
lines
• Remote location of the power transformer from the building is appropriate. [Ref.
27]
Figure 31 on page 114 gives a summary of grounding techniques.
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V. ELECTROEXPLOSIVE DEVICE (EED)
A. DEVELOPMENT
Electrical detonation of black powder was accomplished in 1745 by Doctor Watson
of England. Benjamin Franklin invented electric initiation in 1750 whereas Doctor
Robert Hare developed the bridgewire electric blasting cap in the early ISOO's. Also a
fine platinum bridgewire blasting cap was created by H. Julius Smith. With the
bridgewire there could be testing of the cap circuit. These first bridgewires were 90%
platinum, 10% iridium. 3.T6 inch long, two mm in diameter, and have a 60 ohms
resistance. Some other uses for EEDs are:
• rocket motor ignitors
• electric switches
• mechanical movement in fuses and valves
• thermal batteries
• cable cutters.
There are now more than 100 commercial manufactures of EEDs for commercial and
military uses.
B. DEVICES
Electroexplosive devices are defined as initiator type components which use ac or
dc electrical current energy to act off an explosive propellant or pyrotechnic material
[Ref. 17]. Since EMR energy can induce a current in a conductor, as described by
Faraday and Hertz in the 19th century, the EME and its control becomes paramount.
This is the heart of the HERO problem and the use of EEDs is the HERO problem.
Table IS on page 92 shows some typical applications for EEDs.
There are four possible hazards involving EEDs which are:
• Inadvertent Initiation which is out of order firing resulting in premature firing or
reduced effectiveness
• Dudding of EED which happens as a result of insensitivity of EED over a period
of time resulting in a reduced reliability
• Thermal Stacking which occurs as a result of pulsed radar heating the bridgewire
below the firing temperature as seen in Figure 32 on page 115
Now there are three modes of RF excitation in an EED which are:
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• Differential RF mode as seen in Figure 33 on pace 115 where balanced wire leads
propagate EM energy to FED
• Coaxial firing system between two concentric conductors, as seen in Figure 34 on
page 1 16
• Coaxial mode on a two wire balanced shielded system as seen in Figure 35 on page
117 where the shield is the outer conductor and the wire leads the inner conductor.
[Ref. 17]
EEDs can be categorized in four groups which are:
• Hot Bridgewire Devices (HBW)
• Exploding Bridgewire Devices (EBW)
• Conductive Mix EEDS (CME)
• Carbon Bridge EEDs (CBE).
Currently conductive mix EEDs are not used by the Navy because design problems and
ease of induced RF currents. Because the voltage sensitivity of the carbon bridge EED
and its sensitivity to induced EM energy, they are not used as well. The Flot Bridgewire
devices are the most commonly used. The EBW device has the advantage of requiring
a high current for a short period of time in order to initiate but can be burnt out with
an insufficient current. [Ref. 17]
C. CHARACTERISTICS
1. Parts
The EED is composed of three parts which are:
• inert support structure, the shell or casing
• electro-thermal transducer, the bridgewire
• explosive, detonation material or initiator material.
The main focus is to convert wire current (i.e., electrical energy) to thermal energy or a
shock wave as a result of heat expansion. As seen in Figure 36 on page 117, if there is
a sufficient temperature increase of the electrothermal transducer for a modest time
span, there is a zone of regenerative reaction. On the other hand, regions A and B
represent the extremes regarding time and temperature as an inverse reciprocal of each
other. The transition zone can be represented in terms of probability of occurrence.
The EBW transducer works by the action of a high voltage and high energy
pulse creating a heat shock wave thus setting off the EED. There are two types of
dielectric breakdown EEDs. One type is when the dielectric being broken down is the
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explosive itself, the other type acts more like an ordinary heat transfer system by
creating hot spots which set off the EED. [Ref. 28]
2. Transducer Action
As described for dielectric breakdown EEDs, development of hot spots initiates
the EED firing. If the available energy can be concentrated, then the device would more
often guarantee a successful firing. As seen in Table 19 on page 92 the range for pulse,
power, and current cover several orders of magnitudes and coincide with the level of
currents induced in EED wires as a result of radar, transient, and EMP effects. It is
possible to produce specific EEDs (e.g., ones sensitive to long or short pulses). [Ref. 28]
Deposited Bridge Transducers (DBT), normally made of carbon, exhibit a higher
resistance than most metal filament transducers thus it is more sensitive to electrostatic
energy. Also with current flow there can be a change in the resistance. Table 19 on
page 92 gives a hypothetical comparison of three EEDs. Note the sensitivity of the DBT
to capacitor discharge energy and constant current but, much less sensitive in terms of
voltage. Table 19 on page 92 also illustrates the different ways for EED discharge which
are:






• Constant Voltage when E2 = J —jt- dt
• Capacitance Discharge when £3 = — CF2
where
R = instantaneous EED resistance
Ic = constant current
t = time
Vc = constant voltage
C= capacitance.
There are two types of conditions under which EEDs can fire adiabatically and
non-adiabatically. For the adiabatic case the current pulse is delivered in a time much
less than the time constant x thus the ohmic heat has not had a chance to dissipate. The
general heat equation is extensively discussed in the Analysis chapter.
D. TYPES OF INITIATIONS
There are many types of energy sources capable of posing a threat to prematurely
setting off an EED such as:







Examples of ECC may include exposed sources, stray currents, or potential differences
between grounds. In ER some of the factors causing EED sensitivity to EM radiation
are:
• field intensity
• frequency (particularly the resonance frequency)
• pulse length and pulse repetition rate (which determine whether the process is
adiabatic or not)
• reflections (which contribute to amount of absorption)
• antennas and EED orientation (which affects amount of EM current inducement
into the wires)
• EED and circuitry effectiveness for reception ofEM radiation (as a function of gain
and amount of hardening)
• EED sensitivity (which is a function of the specific design).
The ER from other sources (e.g., radio. TV stations, short wave radio, etc..) are a
constant unwanted initiating source for EEDs. EEDs with loop and dipole circuitry act
as very good receivers when exposed. Table 20 on page 93 gives some safe distances
necessary for EEDs from RF sources. Another potentially dangerous source comes from
the personnel working with the ordnance that contains EEDs or with EEDs themselves.
Some of the factors include:
• type of floor
• floor resistance measuring method
• outer garment material
• position of person (i.e., walking, sitting, or scuffing).





In 1966 a HERO weapon evaluation test procedure was outlined in order to
complete testing in a predictable concise manner. This procedure is outlined in reference
35.
B. PARAMETERS AND RESULTS
In the beginning the missiles were being tested using the go/on go method. This
means that the EEDs actuated or not. The EEDs were made inert and maintained in
their normal configuration. In this method if the EED actuated, then there is clearly
evidence of hazard but. if it does not fire there is no real useful information. If a
statistically valid sample were run this test would be too expensive. The testing steps
involve:
• remove explosive material
• replace EED with initiator
• turn on shipboard transmitters
• examine EED to see whether it had exploded.
The EEDs that initiate the weapon are loaded in their normal configuration with all
explosive charges and propellants removed.
Another method with an instrumented EED was used with greater success. The
instrumented EED was composed of an inert EED with a thermocouple and was placed
in the ordnance. It was properly shielded so that it would not be affected by RE
radiation. This new device made it possible to measure the EED induced current in
terms of the ohmic heating of the bridgewire. The level of current HERO testing is
interested in is called the No Fire Current Rating and is defined as:
... the direct current sensitivity of an EED based on a specified threshold probability
of initiation. [Ref. 13]
The probability is normally set at four standard deviations below the 50% probability
value.
Before testing an ordnance on the ground plane the following information must be
available:
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• the maximum no-fire current (MNFC) of the EED
• the frequency or power level the ordnance is to be tested at
• sensitivity of the recording instrumentation
• available power level.
It is often possible that the required testing power level is higher than the available
power level. Under these conditions either the reading instrumentation will not detect
a current. If a current is detected then as seen in the TESTING chapter the calculation
of the % MNFC is obvious. If a current is not detected then it is assumed that the
induced current is only slightly less than the MDC of the instrumentation. This
calculation is also done in the TESTING chapter.
By the end of 1960, there were four well described HERO tests and procedures which
are the following:
• laboratory tests done at the ground facility
• field tests (weapon testing on board ships)
• Go Xo-Go tests (uninstrumented EEDs)
• instrumented tests (instrumented EEDs with thermocouples).
Go No-Go tests do not prove to be very cost effective and have proven to take too
much time. In this type of test the EEDs are outfitted with explosive beads and then
put into the rocket motor or ordnance. This device is exposed to the RF environment
and either the EED explodes or not. If the go. no-go test were repeated 30 times and
none of the EEDs exploded, then this would not be conclusive proof that one will not
fire on the 31st time. For a 95% confidence level the actual failure rate might be less
than 10° o. In conclusion, 30 repetitions is statistically not enough to define a weapon
as being HERO Safe. [Ref. 29]
Figure 37 on page 118 gives an example of a MNFC calculation. For a particular
case the calculated MNFC may be above the 15% safety level, but the weapon tested
still could have a HERO SAFE ordnance classification if the testing engineers have a
sufficient knowledge of this particular weapons environment and other factors.
The Maximum Allowable Environment (MAE) per frequency band is the safe
environment necessary for weapons that exceed the safety and or reliability RF
environment amounts. The engineer would have to spell out any restrictions to the
EME(e.g., turning off certain types of radar etc..) necessary when storing, moving, or
loading that particular weapon. Below is a sample calculation of the MAE.
47
Given:
-The Test Environment (TE)
-in V/M for communication frequency
-in mW/c/7?2 for radar frequency
-% MNFC
-The weapon HERO criteria
-15% MAES for safety
-45% UAEr for reliability
MAES= 15/% MNFC x TE
(for Communication frequency measured)
MAEr =15/ MNFC 2xTE
(for Radar frequency measured)
MAES= 45/% MNFC x TE
(for Communication frequency measured)
MAEr = 45/ MNFC
2xTE
(for Radar frequency measured)
A number of factors contributed to the origins of the 15% MNFC for safety and
45% MNFC for reliability criteria. Calculations show that a resonance frequency error
could result in a current 2.6 times that for the frequencies on either side of it. Other
factors contributing to a 15% MNFC safety level include:
• the impedance of a crew member's body
• weapon-to-weapon differences and tie-down chains
• the unpredictability of the aircraft-to-deck voltage. [Ref. 15: p. 5-2]
1. Bruceton Test
The Bruceton test is an experimental procedure developed by the Explosive
Research Laboratory used to determine the sensitivity of bulk explosives. The test
procedure consists of dropping a weight at a known height onto an explosive. If the
explosive did not explode then the weight was increased until the material exploded. The
testing is then concentrated in this area. In the testing of EEDs a current sent through
a wire instead of weights being dropped. A maximum no fire stimulus is defined as:
...the greatest stimulus which does not cause initiation within 5 minutes of more
than 1.0% of all electrical initiators at a level of confidence of 95%.
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It is given that 50 initiators are to be tested. The five minute rule appears to be
arbitrary. [Ref. 15: p. 3-6]
In order to ensure personnel safety it has been judged that 15% of the MNFC
would be adequate and 45% of the MNFC would be appropriate to ensure reliability
of the ordnance for proper use. These standards are quite arbitrary and are still a matter
of debate. [Ref. 15]
2. One Shot Test
The testing method for one shot items involves using the test to failure concept
in order to establish a reliable margins of safety. This method has the advantage of
requiring a relatively small number of trials in order to secure the desired standard
deviation and confidence. In addition, this method is flexible in that it can be employed
for a larger range of experiments (e.g., rocket motors, switches, relays, etc....). By testing
to failure the lower limit behavioral stress can be observed and a safety margin (oK) can
be set where the larger the K value, the greater the reliability of the specimen. This
method assumes that the life time of a specimen under stress survives long enough to
calculate failure. If the lifetime is too short, then only the stress level can be evaluated.
The EEDs fit into this category and are thus called one-shot items.
It is assumed that there is a current just adequate to fire the EED as well as
currents ( 1 ) to ensure a fire every time, and (2) just inadequate to fire the EED. It is also
assumed that the range of distribution for adequate fire is gaussian and that all
inadequate current levels will not fire the EED.
Given the above assumptions the exact cause of failure is not important in order
to determine the safety margin which becomes an important advantage. Another
important advantage of the EED (i.e.. initiation temperature or maximum current or
voltage before discharge). Only as few as 15 to 20 one-shot items are necessary for a
complete experiment.
The one-shot test is a three step process:
• establish the acceptance (or failure) criteria (EAC)
• determine the test interval (DTI)
• select the stress level (SSL). [Ref. 30]
It is critical that EAC is accomplished carefully and accurately to ensure success in the
test. A complete list of all methods causing or aiding in unacceptable performance
should be carefully and completely investigated . Included in this list should be modes
of failure, tolerance limits of the item, and undesirable responses all of which cause
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deviation from the items preferred arena of performance. Establishing such failure
criteria correctly is the first step to guarantee credibility in the one-shot results.
For DTI the determination of the test interval proves the statistical validity of
the method. As a rule the test results at the endpoints, which determine the test interval,
should be consistent for any sample size of items. If the lower endpoint is defined as
giving a successful item operation and the upper endpoint a failed operation, then stress
convergence toward the lower limit would prove to be statistically unsatisfactory because
the lower limit would not have been reached. However, if the stress levels converge
toward the upper limit it could be assured that lower safe limit had been reached.
Now that the criteria and interval procedures are complete, it is now time to
describe how the testing stress is selected. The testing stress is the item selected from the
criteria list which could affect performance. The first stress level would naturally be half
way in between the two endpoints. A good statement to describe picking of the stress
levels states:
The general rule for obtaining the (n + l)s' stress level, having completed n
trials is to work backward in the test sequence, starting at the n'h trial until a
previous trial (call it the p"' trial) is found such that there are as many successes as
failures in the p'1' through the n :h trials. The (n + 1)" stress level is then obtained by
averaging the n,h stress level with the p
th
stress level. If there exists no previous stress
level satisfying the requirement stated above, then the («+l) f/l stress level is
obtained by averaging the n'h stress level with the lower or upper stress limits of the
test interval according to whether the n !k result was a failure or a success. [Ref. 30]
Figure 38 on page 118 is an example of a one shot test and results. Note that after the
5 r,i trial, which was a success, there could not be an even number of success and failure
tests and the 6 th trial became an average of the 5"' trial plus the upper limit. The upper
limit was chosen because the 5'1' trial was a success.
With the given stress levels and outcomes, the mean OuJ, standard deviation (
at ) f and the likelihood ratio (/.) are determined. The likelihood ratio determines whether















Q normalized stress deviation (68)
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g = 2.x 2e 2 = Gaussian ordinatefor t , (69)
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— outcome weighting parameter (70)
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The letter x is equal to a random sample of N observations where each sample is an
independent random variable in a Gaussian distribution. By using an approximation for
H and a , which is a straight calculation, A,u and Aa can be determined and estimates
of ii e and o e are calculated. Now the unbiased standard deviation is given by:
o~f (72)
where f> is less than 1 and determined by many computer runs [Ref. 30 : Section 5]. /?





are calculated from a chi-square distribution and confidence levels
are established. Reference 30 in sections 4 and 5 give a detailed description of the step
by step process from determining the jj. and a to calculating the likelihood ratio and
comparing it against a prechosen critical level as a test for lot acceptance.
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VII. ANALYSIS
A. HEAT FLOW EQUATIONS
Up to this point the HERO an EMP phenomena have been discussed in regards to
the impact on the fleet ordnance and weapons systems. The hardening of ordnance and
these systems by various means have also been discussed as well as current HERO and
EMP testing procedures on EEDs. The question how these two different phenomena
can be related. One remaining fact to note is that EEDs are initiated or detonated when
the EEDs temperature rises to a particular degree. This ohmic heating phenomena is
not dependent on any particular time or shape of a current function but relies on basic
heat flow dynamics.
The electrothermal parameters of the EEDs are not exact values and at best can be
described in terms of averages. It is seen that variations can occur with individual EEDs,
environment of testing, and material on the bridgewire [Ref. 31]. It is assumed that these
fluctuations are sufficiently small as to be insignificant. The basic differential heat flow
equation governing the conversion of current to bridgewire heating is:
\_CP^\ + lY6\ = P{t) (73)
where
CP = heat capacity
Y= heat loss factor
6 = bridgewire temperature above ambient
P(t)= power level of electrical signal
[]. = thermal energy used in wire
[];, = heat flow away from wire.
For wires with a coefficient of resistance a:
R^Rod+ad) - 6= R'~ R° (74)
where
R = initial wire resistance. [Ref. 2S]
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Friday [Ref. 32] states the general heat flow equation representing joule heating of
EEDs as:
0(r) = 6
a + P(t)R( 1 - e^~)\ t > (75)
where
6(t) = temperature as a function of time ( °C)
B
a
= ambient temperature ( °C)
t= time of current flow (sec)
P(t)= P(t)R
e
(watts) = power due to heating
R
e
= EED electrical resistance (ohms)
R= thermal resistance or thermal gradient (°Cj Watts)
t= RCF = thermal time constant.
Here the equation is stated in terms of the ambient temperature and is the differentiated
form of the above equation. When t > > t. a steady state temperature will be




= e ' temperature rise (76)
— !
0(0 = a + (00 - 6a)e ' ; P(t) = cooling equation (77)
where
6 = initial temperature.
This equation shows an exponential cooling of the EED bridgewire. It is important to
mention that if the explosive mixture characteristics are easily changed prior to the
bridgewire reaching the critical temperature, then the critical temperature may increase
beyond the ability of the EED and dudding results. These changes could occur if P(t)
is a pulse type or minimal function only resulting in a sub-critical bridgewire temperature
but high enough to produce dudding. [Ref. 32]






becoming essentially an adiabatic process. If the function P(t) is a series of pulses either
periodic or not, the cooling equation above would be used in this case as well, assuming
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the cooling time between pulses car. This would require using a combination of
adiabatic and non-adiabatic equations. This phenomena is known as thermal stacking
and is illustrated in Figure 39 on page 119. Because this is an adiabatic process, there
is no heat loss and there exists a peak pulse power amplitude which is sufficient to
initiate an EED. The energy of this pulse is the area under the curve of a power versus
time diagram. Assuming a rectangular pulse the energy calculations are:
Uf=PW (79)
where
\V= pulse width in seconds
Uf = energy to initiate EED with a single pulse (joules)
P = peak power = P-R
e
From the above equation, the thermal capacity can be calculated as:
and also it shows that the temperature rise is proportional to the pulse energy. For a
loaded EED (e.g.. squib MK1 ) some typical thermal constants are:
Cf =2.1xi0' 6 watts-sec. °C
R = 1.471 °C milliwatt
t = RC ^ 4000 microseconds. [Ref. 33]
y = 600 microwatts °C
CF = 2.4 microjoules'°C
The Firing temperature for a Squib MK1 is 700°C. [Ref. 33]
If there is a steady power level supplied to the bridgewire with temperature
proportional to t giving:
I
2Re
e = -FJL t, (si)










Now if the resistance is temperature dependent then:




where a is the temperature coefficient of resistivity (——
-). For a Squib MK 1 MOD
a = .0008. [Ref. 33]
If the current I can be assumed to be a constant and the temperature coefficient of




This would give a basic heat flow equation of:





The solution to this differential equation is:
I
2R



















In the case where there is no heat loss the system (bridgewire and current) can also







C = capacitance of the capacitor
V = instantaneous voltage
Q = initial charge.
This gives a temperature rate change and solution of:
,2 ?<0
e(t) = Qi—j-CPC (91)
where
—t
q = QeR,C (92)





If it is assumed that R
e






6 = j^ (eRec -e--). (94)
Also the time to reach a maximum temperature (again still assuming no heat loss) is:
W =—2 ~ ln( -~r
)
(95)
and the maximum temperature would become:
6™* = ic; e
7
• (96)
So by manipulation of the basic heat flow equation, an appropriate equation can be
derived to cover a specific type of EED or condition of firing (e.g., EMP or HERO
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effects). With information on the Squib MK1 MOD EED collected from NSWC,
Figure 49 on page 127 gives some sample calculation results using the maximum
temperature equations for long and short time intervals. For this particular EED it is
assumed to fire at 700°C at a constant current [Ref. 33]. Obviously all current functions
are not linear but nevertheless the answers are close to what would be predicted. The
constants and therefore the resulting answers are very rough estimates but are close
enough to warrant further study using accurate values and running a full scale
simulation. In the case of HERO the equations seem to work better possibly due to the
lack of many nonlinearities as in the EMP case.
B. TRANSFER FUNCTIONS
1. EMP pickup
Determining the currents and voltages produced by the EMP generated electric
and magnetic fields is quite difficult for all but the most simple of geometries of
collectors. Unfortunately the collectors usually behave in a nonlinear fashion. In order
to simplify this problem the thevenin equivalent circuit concept has been greatly used.
This involves characterizing the transfer phenomena by an equivalent voltage generator
or impedance source. The source voltage and impedance are a function of arrival angle
and collector geometry. When the collectors are small compared to the wavelength
qtiasistatic case characterization is quite simple, but when they are greater than or equal
to the wavelength size, characterization is much more complexed. Under this situation
a lumped parameter representation is used where the collector system is reduced to a
circuit analysis problem. Computer codes such as SCEPTRE and CIRCUS are used to
analyze such a nonlinear circuit outlay. [Ref. 2: p. 35]
When determining EMP transfer to voltage and current two mathematical
approaches are used:
• frequency domain analysis using LaPlace or Fourier transform
• time domain analysis.
These equations can either be solved by hand or computer codes as mentioned above.
The codes can be used if the problems can be modeled as lumped electrical parameters.
In this figure the antenna is modeled as having a two terminal network output with a
thevenin equivalent voltage and source impedance (measured or theoretical).
By means of Fourier analysis the time domain of the wave form can be
transformed to the frequency domain by:
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Too
Ejju) = Eft)**"' (97 )
J
-oo
By circuit analysis using Efju>) the output voltage is developed. Once again Ricketts
[Ref. 2: p. 48] shows that by using Fourier analysis the voltage time domain can be
deduced:
VM-k V2(j<o)e}o,'do). (98)
System nonlinearity occurs as a result of electronic systems containing vacuum
tubes, diodes, and transistors. The nonlinearity (which includes hysteresis effects) can
be most effectively solved by the above mentioned computer codes as long as the
collector system can be represented as lumped parameters (e.g., resistors, capacitors, and
inductors). Figure 40 on page 120 gives an example of the lumped parameter nonlinear
(LP\) method using the Fourier Transform method (FTM) for a 45° angle of arrival.
Figure 41 on page 120 gives the equivalent lumped parameter circuits for the first two
resonances. In this figure there is one circuit to synthesize the variation of effective
height with frequency and the other to generate the output impedance. [Ref. 2]
In Waters [Ref. 34] for security reasons a true and classified electric field vector
function was not obtainable, but an unclassified function for the electric field vector is:
£(0 = E e~ar sinh(to) VIM (99)
where a and b are rise and decay time constants and E is the peak electric field or
E{t) = ± E [e {~a+b)1 - e {-a-b)t] VJM. (100)
When solving for a and b, assuming that the rise time (t) is < < the decay time (T).
then:
{-~r)[2^-\]









By assuming a plane wave for the EMP wave and using the Poynting vector, the power
density (P(t)) is:
E2(t) w




P(i)dt = -r£- e~2at smh2(bt)di = °— — {joules/m 2 ). (105)
o
48U" Jo 4S0na{a 2 - b 2 )
The type of filter used in the circuit design does significantly determine the
amount of pulse energy being transmitted. For low-pass, high-pass, and band-pass
filters, there are equations which calculate what fraction of the total pulse energy able
to pass through the filter or the amount of energy contained in the particular region.
The validity of these equations come into question because an EMP contains a broad
band of frequencies and is an EM wave and not a current source per se. Figure 42 on
page 121 shows the equations for these filters and serve to explain this phenomena. Also
note that Table 21 on page 93 gives some typical energies necessary to cause some type
of malfunction within particular devices. Only a small amount of joule energy is
necessary to cause upset and burnout. These numbers are consistent with the figures in
Table 15 on page 90 and again show the resistance of vacuum tubes to burnout. [Ref.
34]
2. HERO Transfer
In the HERO chapter electric energy transfer was discussed in terms of a
uniform field disregarding the type of antenna used in the energy transfer. In this
chapter a generic equation can be arrived at and is reported as:
GRGTWX >. / CRPJ 2
(106)
V (4xr) 2R V (4k*)
The amount and type of current induced in wires leading to an EED depends on the type




• Toploaded Monopole Antenna.
These equations are valid for a frequency range up to 32 MHz and assume that the EED
lead wires are made of copper. Also factors related to ground effects (e.g., reflection and
grounding) are not considered. The factors relating to current induction in antennas has




• frequency. [Ref. 35]
a. Loop Antenna
As noted in Figure 43 on page 122 a loop antenna can be formed by wires
that are in direct contact with each other (e.g., soldered wires) or wires that have a
capacitive contact (e.g., twisted or braided wires). This twisted and braided wire
influence cannot be neglected because it can act as a capacitor eventually discharging a
current.
The basic equation for current induction is:
Vi
i=Yr (107)
where YR is the sum of all of the resistances and V, is the induced voltage. The law of
induction states that the voltage is equal to the magnetic flux. This gives the equation:
V>= A—= A >1°— (108)
where A equals the area of the loop. If sinusoidal time variations only are considered,
then:
D nuME
V^Ah (dH =—^ (109)
where
D= diameter of the loop antenna
E = electric field intensitv
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H = magnetic field intensity
Z = 1207t Q (wave impedance of free space).
Now the sum of the resistances is equal to:
Vr = rr + reed + r„ + rl (110)
where
RR = radiation resistance of the loop
Reed = EED resistance
R K = ohmic losses
RL = tuning capacitor losses.
Schwab in Ref. 35 formulates the equation for the above resistances. For R R the
equation is:
^^ = 197( -^- )
4
+ 6S6000( -^- f (Q) ;— <0.35 (111)/ /. /.
nD
where / equals the free space wavelength. For a small -1— , the formula would drop the




where d is the wire diameter and
V OCO/J.
This gives a final first order equation of:
xo = J 77777 (skin depth). ( 1 1 3)
R -JL I121L rii4)
Ref. 35 derives an approximation for R L giving:
[" 1 20n(
^f- ) + 1 5500( ^f- )
4
] ln( -^
~QRL = ~ : -=L" " (H5)
where Q is defined as, "... quality factor of a lossy reactive element...." and comes as a
result of the twisted or braided wire ends. Figure 44 on page 123 is an example of how
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current is influenced by frequency and EED resistance while Figure 45 on page 124
shows the influence of the loop diameter.
b. Dipole Antenna
A dipole antenna has a different configuration than a loop antenna as seen
in Figure 46 on page 125 with a linear sloped current distribution as seen in Figure 47
on page 125. If we assume that the dipole is oriented for maximum pickup then the
open circuit voltage becomes:






i + (-r) <0.5 (117)











RL = 0.6 ln(-^-)cot(0.52-^Z^)
(119)
(120)
where Q is equal to 200. Note the similarity between Rw for a loop and dipole. The
curves for current as a function of frequency are similar in shape to those for a loop
antenna. When R EED increases the peak current for any given frequency is reduced and
the current also decreases with an increase in frequency for frequencies greater than 20
MHz.
c. Toploaded Antenna
A toploaded antenna is formed when a metallic object has a much larger
horizontal component than vertical. Aircraft and missiles are perfect examples of
toploaded antennas. The craft acts as an antenna when a wire connected to an EED
makes ground contact. Information concerning toploaded antennas is empirically
determined due to the oddity of design of the missiles or aircraft. But as the case with
the other two types of antennas, the higher the REED , the lower the induced current.
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Schwab [Ref. 35] gives several comparisons of the three types of antennas.
The loop antenna has a maximum current in the 10 to 30 MHz range while an increase
in radiation causes an increase in resistance which in turn reduces the current. This is
also true for dipole antennas. For the dipole antenna, current increases with dipole
length as an increase in loop diameter increases it's current. In comparing all three types
of antennas, the toploaded monopole will fire much easier for a particular EED than the
other two. The loop antenna records the highest current for EED firing. [Ref 35]
C. COMPARISON
By working through the transfer functions and heat flow equations, it is possible to
compare EMP levels with HERO levels involving weapons protection. From the heat
flow equations the firing temperature of the EED can be calculated. If the premise is
true that EED firing is purely based on ohmic type heating, then comparison of these
two programs come down to some basic steps. One approach might be:
• Determine the EMP threat (e.g.. 10,000 V/M)
• Use the transfer function to determine the current function
• Use the adiabatic heat flow equations to get a temperature function (i.e.,
temperature as a function of current) and a maximum temperature
• Given a maximum temperature, use the HERO heat flow equations to derive a
current function
• Plug this current function into the HERO transfer function to arrive at a power
density around an antenna or with sufficient information, power density at the
source.
An appropriate code incorporating SCEPTRE or CIRCUS could be generated including
various types of radar waveforms to come up with an equivalent HERO level for a given
EMP. Thereby testing a weapon for EMP, the appropriate HERO level can be set and
compared against already exsisting HERO standards. Better yet. by determining the
needed power by an EMP to fire a particular EED, and thus set 15% and 45% MXFC
levels, and equivalent HERO current can be set along with the safety and reliability
standards. Figure 48 on page 126 shows a scheme of the above.
It appears that the best function in comparing an EMP to the induced current
comes from computer codes mentioned above Due to nonlinearities investigators found
it too difficult and time consuming to do the calculations by hand. These current
functions resemble damped sinusoidal waves of short duration. It is possible that his
function could be approximated to just a damped wave. Depending on the circuitry
associated with a particular temperature equation can be used for either a capacitor type
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discharge of current or for a conservative constant current pulse. These equations can
be found in the earlier part of this chapter. By making conservative approximations, a
maximum temperature can be generated. By knowing the thermal and electrical
constants and by using the peak temperature from the EMP heat flow equations, a
constant current can be derived. With an equivalent current (i.e. equivalent to a




A detailed description of the EMP and HERO programs has been given. The EMP
and EM radar radiation phenomena as well as the protection against these phenomena
have been thoughly investigated. Hardening of weapon systems and the EED are
common areas of interest for these programs as it is their charter to protect weapon
systems and ordnance from radiation. Each program has a different type of radiation
to contend with but both relate to the ordnance via the EED and ohmic heating of the
EED to initiate detonation of a device. This sphere of commonality leads to a logical
conclusion of combining, if not all, at least certain areas within the EMP and HERO
program. Some of the benefits of combining the two programs include:
Simultaneous qualification of all weapon systems and ordnance for any EMV,
EMI. or EMC problem
Simultaneous inspection and survev of ships and other platforms for HERO and
EMP safety
A large overlap in hardening techniques would require less duplication of effort
United representation on the EMCAB to alleviate EMP and HERO problems in
the design phase of the procurement process
Only one set of instructions and standards would have to be promulgated
Only one set of safety standards covering all EM radiation including transient
radiation
Only one set of certification criteria for ship surveys
Ensures only one nomenclature
Best testing methods can be adopted ensuring reliability of data
Leads the way for incorporation of transient radiation and future forms of EM
radiation hazards to ordnance and weapon systems.
Given the reliability of equations in the previous chapter, it is possible to show the
equal comparison between a wire current produced as a result of an EMP and Radar
by simply equating the maximum temperature produced by each phenomena. What is
worked out via the equations can simply be tested by comparing empirical data for the
MNFC versus the theoretical MNFC results. This of course assumes that the equations
themselves are valid. By taking experiment further the question must be asked if an
EMP level can be translated into an equivalent HERO level? If so would this result in
a modification of the present HERO standards?
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One question arising is what effect would ofT axis Bremsstrahlung radiation from a
charged particle beam have on EEDs and weapon electronics associated with an EED?
By using available information on rad(si) per second dose rate levels available from a free
electron laser, there may be a high enough current generated within the semiconductor
devices to not only cause electronic damage or upset but also EED detonation or
dudding [Ref. 36]. Testing of currently available U. S. offensive weapons against this
short but very high rad(si) per second dose would be prudent and aid in meeting future
design and production needs for weapon systems and ordnance safety, protection, and
hardening.
Through a careful search of the literature for theoretical postulation and empirical
results equations were found which describe how the EMP and HERO phenomena can
be converted into a current. Heat flow equations show how the current can produce
ohmic heating in the EED apparatus. If this temperature is high enough, there is
detonation. Because the detonation is temperature dependent and not directly current
dependent, the two programs have an indelible tie together that can be exploited for the
benefit of not only the two groups (EMP and HERO) but also for those that they serve.
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APPENDIX A. HISTORY OF EMP
1945 TRINITY EVENT; electronic equipment shielded reportedly because of
Fermi's expectations of EM signals from a nuclear burst.
1951-2 First deliberate EMP observations made by Shuster. Cowan, and Reines.
Reines proposes several possible mechanisms. Diagnostic and detection
capabilities recognized.
195-4 Garwin (LANL) estimates prompt gamma-produced Compton currents as
primary sources of EMP.
1957 Bethe makes estimate of high-altitude EMP signals using electric dipole
model (early-time peak incorrect).
1957 Haas makes magnetic field measurements for PLUMBOB test series
(interest in the possibility of EMP setting off magnetic mines).
1958 Joint British U.S. meeting begins discussions of system EMP vulnerability
and hardness issues.
1958 Komaneets (USSR) publihes open literature paper on EMP from atomic
explosion.
1958 First high-altitude tests TEAK and ORANGE in operation HARDTACK.
First indication of the magnitude of the high-altitude EMP signal. The
only good measurements were from over the horizon.
1959 Popham and Taylor (U.K.) present a theory of "radioflash".
1959 First interest in EMP coupling to underground cables of Minuteman missle.
1962 FISHBOWL hish-altitude tests; EMP measurements driven off scale despite
TEAK and ORANGE data.
1962 SMALL BOY near-surface EMP test.
1962 Karzas and Latter publish two open literature papers on using EMP signals
for detection of nuclear tests; bomb case EMP and hydromagnetic EMP
considered.
1963 EMP hardening of military systems discussed in the open literature.
1963-4 Firsr EMP svstem tests carried out by the Air Force Weapons Laboratory
(AFWL).
1963-4 Longmire gives a series of EMP lectures at AFWL: presents detailed theory
of ground burst EMP. close-in EMP. and shows that the peak of the
high-altitude EMP signals is explained by magnetic field turning (magnetic
dipole signal).
1964 First note in the LASL AFWL EMP notes series published.
1965 Karzas and Latter publish first open literature paper giving high-frequency
approximation for the high-altitude magnetic dipole signal.
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1965 Underground simulation of EMP discussed by Daley.
1967 Construction of ALECS as the first guided-wave simulator is completed for
EMP simulation on missiles.
1967 Ajax underground nuclear test.
1970 Preliminary specifications presented by Schaefer for EMP underground test.
1974 MING BLADE underground EMP test for confirmation of near-surface
burst EMP models.
1975 DINING CAR underground EMP test as the first system hardware EMP
test.
1975 MIGHTY EPIC underground EMP test.
1978 Special joint issue on the nuclear EMP in IEEE Transactions on Antennas
and Propagation and also on Electromagnetic Compatibility.
1978 Nuclear EMP meeting in Albuquerque under IEEEsponsorship.
1980 Large transmission line is installed in AURORA flash x-ray test cell to
simulate tactical source region EMP.
1981 Direct electron injection in AURORA test cell gives credible simulation of
deep source region EMP.
1982 Nuclear EMP meeting in Albuquerque in conjunction with the IEEE and
National Radio Science. [Ref. 37]
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When the burst is above 50 kilometers the gamma rays are not
as easily absorbed by the atmosphere as the x-rays are absorbed.
Therefore at this altitude x-rays are the predominant EMP
mechanism.
For high altitude bursts the tangent portion of the burst traverses
the ionophere in space. The different frequencies travel through
the ionosphere at different velocities therefore, the dispersed
EMP is different from the original pulse.
Magnetohydrodynamic EMP. For a high altitude burst the
fireball and expanding debris cause perturbations and distortions
of the earth's geomagnetic field. The burst ionizes the air around
it becoming very conductive both the debris and region. This
causes the perturbations of the geomagnetic field which lasts
seconds and possibly disrupts long cable systems.
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APPENDIX C. TESTING AND SIMULATION FACILITIES
Below is a brief description of some of the important simulators.
ALECS The first wave guide simulator built in 1967. Used to simulate
high altitude bursts with a maximum field of 10 kilo volts per
meter.
used to simulate high altitude burst on low level systems.











Same description as in ACHILLES I.
These simulators are a horizontally polarized hybrid and are used
to simulate high altitude bursts on low level systems.
Same description as in ACHILLES II.
Used to verify EMP hardening of large aircraft of a high altitude
burst. It is a threat level guided wave simulator.
This is a threat level advanced research EMP simulator with an
output peak of 4 megavolts a rise time of 6 nanoseconds and
decay of 250 nanoseconds.
This is a Navy hybrid horizontally polarized simulator for low
level ship simulation of high altitude bursts.
This is a transportable EMP simulator for high level ground
systems testing against high altitude simulated bursts.
This is a radiating EMP simulator used to simulate high altitude
bursts for low level testing and is airborne.
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APPENDIX D. HISTORY OF HERO AND EEDS
A. HISTORY OF HERO
1880's Michael Faraday and Heinrich Hertz showed that EMR can
induce currents in conducting wires.
1887 Marconi demonstrates use of wireless between ship and shore.
1899 First American Navy message transmitted.
1899 Wireless transmission used in naval maneuvers.
1903 Christian Hulsmeyer developes a primitive collision avoidance
radar.
1910 All U. S. Naval vessels earning 50 or more passengers 200 or
more miles are required to have a wireless.
1952 Bureau of Ordnance rescinds regulations governing ordnance
safety in a RF field.
1956 First comprehensive HERO test done aboard USS Franklin D.
Roosevelt.
1958 A group of engineers, scientists, and technicians assembled at
Dahlgren, VA, to prepare testing aboard the USS Cony.
1959 HERO formally organized at Dahlgren.
1959 HERO testing program given official status.
1960 HERO ordnance accidents reported as an "unexplained" cause.
1960 Ground plane designed at Dahlgren. VA.
1960 Money appropriated to build first ground plane.
1960 Basic testing procedures were established and published.
1961 Bismuth-Antimony (Bi-Sb) thermocouple accepted.
1961 Design guide for manufactures of ordnance first published.
1963 Navy HERO program tests all ordnance containing EEDs.
1964 First military specifications for HERO produced (MIL-P-24014).
1965 Bureau of Naval Weapons produced NAVWEP OD 30393. the
HERO Design Guide.
1966 NAVSEA responsible for all shipboard and field surveys.
1967 CNO establishes a safety survey team for aircraft carriers.
1972 Second military specifications for HERO produced
(MIL-STD-1385A).
71
1981 Instruction for existence and continuation of HERO procram
originates (OPNAVINST 8023.2C).
1982 Third militarv specifications for HERO produced
(MIL-STD-1385B).
1985 CNO promulgates OPNAVNOTE 5100 limiting personnel
exposure to EM energy.
1987 Commander. NAVSEA Systems Command recognizes HERO
Program with NAVSEAIXST 8020.7B. [Ref. 15]
B. HISTORY OF EED
1745 Doctor Watson of the Royal Society of England exploded black
powder with an electric spark.
1750 Ben Franklin improved on Watson's demonstration by
compressing the black power in a case.
1830 Moses Shaw patented the electric firing of black powder
(gunpowder) by an elecrtric spark through fulminating silver and
gunpowder.
1831 William Bickford invented the safety fuze and built a factory in
Cornwall. England.
1830-1832 Dr. Robert Hare developed bridgewire method of electrical
blasting.
1864-1867 Alfred Xobel developed a method of initiating nitroglycerin by
using safety fuze initiating, black powder ignitors and later
capsules of mercury fulminate, the first commerical detonator.
1870's FI. Julius Smith successfully introduced bridgewire initiated
electric blasting caps and developed a portable, generator-type
blasting machine.
1895 Delay electric blasting caps utilizing safety fuze as the delay train,
introduced by H. Julius Smith.
1913 "Cordeau" detonating cord introduced into the United States.
1926 Du Pont replaced mercury fulminate with tetryl as the base
charge in its blasting caps.
Late 1920's Vented delay electric blasting caps with internal delay train and
greater uniformity introduced.
1930's Replacement of mercury fulminate in ignition and primer charges
was begun with the use of a variety of more stable explosive
compounds.
1930's Ventless delay caps introduced.
1937 Detonating cord with PETX in a fabric braid developed, replaced
"Cordeau" cord.
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1940's Plastic replaced cotton yarn enamel as insulation for electric
blasting cap leg wires and improved sealing of electric blasting
caps with rubber plugs appeared.
1940's Tetryl replaced by PETX as cap base charge.
19-46 Short-interval delay electric blasting caps introduced having delay
intervals in milliseconds rather than seconds.
19-48 Use of capacitor discharge type blasting machines began
replacing a major share of the generator types with safer and
more reliable power units.
1950 Delay connectors for detonating cord developed providing a
relatively precise delay of the detonating cord.
1960 Low-energy detonating cord introduced which led to improved
nonelectric detonating systems.
1976 Nonelectric delay caps introduced, which provided improved
timing and reduced noise levels. [Ref. 15]
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APPENDIX E. EME LEVELS
The following tables are Electromagnetic Environmental Levels from 1972 to 1986.
Table 1. ELECTROMAGNETIC ENVIRONMENTAL LEVELS OF MIL-STD-13i
1972: [Ref. 15 ]































1982: [Ref. 15 1
ENVIRONMENTAL LEVELS OF MIL-STD-1385,









































Table 3. ELECTROMAGNETIC ENVIRONMENTAL LEVELS OF MIL-STD-1385B, 1 AL
1986: [Ref. 15 ]
Frequency (MHz) Field Intensity[V(rms)/m]
Average Power Density


















































APPENDIX F. HERO WEAPON EVALUATION TEST PROCEDURES
As noted in APPENDIX D. HERO weapon evaluation tests aboard ships and field
activities begun in 1966. The following is an outline of the major steps in such an
evaluation:
Request Time, 13 weeks prior to test.
Weapons Officer provides appropriate documentation 12 weeks prior to test.
Weapons Officer provides a complete inert weapon and 12 of each EED in that
weapon 10 weeks prior to the test.
Consultation with field and command personnel 9 weeks prior to the test.
Review and Submission of the test plan 8 weeks prior to the test.
Approval of the test plan 6 weeks prior to the test.
Special equipment installed into the weapons 4 weeks prior to the test.
Perform test over a 2 week period leading to week 0.
Prepare test report at week 0.
Review of test report.
Certify weapons if the test is satisfactory.
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APPENDIX G. SUSCEPTIBILITY CURVES
The following graphs are a series of susceptibility curves for communication and
radar frequencies. These graphs give the amount of power density (for radar
frequencies) or electric field strength (for communication frequencies) necessary to
present a potential hazard to ordnance. Figure 1 and Figure 3 on page 80 are curves for
communication frequencies and Figure 2 on page 79 and Figure 4 on page SI are curves
for radar frequencies. Figure 1 and Figure 2 on page 79 represent field intensities that
are potentially Hazardous to ordnance in optimal coupling configurations while
Figure 3 on page 80 and Figure 4 on page 81 represent field intensities that are
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Figure 4. Weapons Requiring Restrictions - Radar frequencies
APPENDIX H. TABLES
Table 4. TYPICAL COLLECTORS OF EMP ENERGY: [Ref. 1
: P- 520]
"Long runs of cable, piping, or conduit
"Large antennas, antenna feed cables,
guy wires, antenna support towers
"'Overhead power and telephone lines and support towers
"Long runs of electrical wiring, conduit, etc., in buildings
"•Metallic structural components (girders),
reinforced bars, corrugated roof,




Table 5. DEGREES OF SUSCEPTIBILITY TO THE EMP: [Ref. 1 : p. 525]
^ Most Susceptible
Low-power, high-speed digital computer, either transistorized or
vacuum tube (operational upset)
Systems employing transistors or semiconductor rectifiers (either
silicon or selenium):
Computers and power supplies




Some telephone equipment that is partially transistorized
Transistorized receivers and transmitters
Transistorized 60 to 400 cps converters
Transistorized process control systems
Power system control and communication links
Less Susceptible
Vacuum-tube equipment that does not include semiconductor rectifiers:
Transmitters Intercom systems
Receivers Teletype-telephone
Alarm systems Power Supplies
Equipment employing low-current switches, relays, meters:
Alarms Panel indicators and status
Life-support systems boards






Long power cable runs employing dielectric insulation
Equipment associated with high-energy storage capacitors
Inductors
Least Susceptible
High-voltage 60 cps equipment:
Transformers, motors Rotary converters
LampM filament) Heavy-duty relays,
Heaters Circuit breakers





[Ref. 1 : p. 524]
IN DECREASING




Power rectifier semiconductor diodes
Vacuum tubes( least sensitive)
Table 7. ATTRIBUTES INVOLVING HARDENING DESIGN: [Ref. 5 : p. 89]




Life Hardness Surveillance Costs
Ease of Testing Maintenance Costs
S4
Table 8. THE BENEFITS OF SHIELDING: [Rcf. 5 : p. 90]
Feature Benefit(s)
*Can attenuate "Wartime" EMP
signals down to level of
"Peacetime" system noise
"Can be certain system will
survive and if it works in
peacetime it will work in
wartime
*Do not need to test electronic
susceptibility to verify
hardness
*Do not need to control parts
*Can test shielding effectiveness
rather quickly and easily
-techniques exist to find leaks







"'Minimum downtime for assessment,
surveillance, and maintenance
"Lower life cycle cost
"Can provide protection for all
equipment inside shield
'"Allows future modifications to
be made easily without impacting
EMP hardness
Table 9. WORST RF ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS: [Ref. 15
]
Frequency Power
Power expected in the
Future
.150 - 2 Mc 8000 watts
2 - 26 Mc 10000 watts
2"
- 55 Mc 4 watts
115- 160 Mc 120 watts
215 - 225 Mc 1500000 watts 5000000 watts
225 - 400 Mc 750 watts
960 - 3000 Mc 500000 watts 25000000 watts
3000 - 10025 Mc 2000000 watts 10000000 watts
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Table 10. RF ENVIRONMENT CRITERIA TO BE APPLIED IN WEAPONS












































NOTE- The above values do not reflect incorporation ofAX SPG-59 radar.
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Table 13. GROUND PLANE TRANSMITTERS: 1962-1970 [Ref. 15]
Year Obtained Transmitter Frequency Pcmer
Before 1960 AN FRT-5 4-26 MHz






1966 A PS -20 2.88 GHz 2 MW













Table 14. GROUND PLANE TRANSMITTERS: 1972-1982 [Ref. 15]
Year Obtained Transmitter
Band Frequency Power




2-35 GHz 1 m\V(Magnetron)
1972 "MCL" 50-1000 MHz 1 kW avg.
1975 Sanders A 140-240 MHz 2 kW avg.. 300k\Y peak
1975 Sanders B 590-480 MHz replaced SPS-1"
1979 Sanders A 140-240 MHz 2 kW avg.. 300kW peak
1979 Sanders B 590-480 MHz 300 k\V peak
1979 Sanders C 870-960 MHz 2 kW avg.. 250kYY peak
19S2 Sanders C 870-960 MHz 2 kW ava., 250k\V peak
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Table 15. ESTIMATE ENERGY REQUIRED FOR EMP FAILURE: [Ref. 3
p. 430]
Device Type Failure Energy (/* joules)
Point-contact diodes 1N82A-1N69A
Integrated circuits (J.A7Q9














2-100 x 10 3
10
4
Table 16. SEMICONDUCTOR JUNCTION DEVICE
CONSTANT GUIDELINES: [Ref 3 : p. 433]
EMP DAMAGE
Type of Semiconductor

























> 1 x 10'
> 1 x 10-'
> 1 x 10-2











8 x 10~ 3





> 1 x 10°
> 1 x 10°
>2 x 10-'
> 1 x 10-'
> 1 x 10-'
Integrated Circuits
Input signal-to-ground 3 x 10-4 2 x 10' > 1 X Id" 2
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Table 18. TYPICAL APPLICATIONS OF EEDS: [Ref. 17
Rocket Ordnance
Ignition systems for solid and liquid propellant rockets




Ignition systems for solid and liquid propellants
Explosive actuation of relays, switches, and valves
Self-destruct systems
Power for electric generators
Power for gyroscopic guidance systems
Power for control surfaces
Separation of nose cones
Inflation of flotation bags for recovery systems
Detonation for warheads
Aircraft
Jettison of wing tanks, pods, and cargo
Ejection of bombs, seats, rockets, and canopies
Launching of aircraft
Actuation of emergency hydraulic systems
Starter units for jet engines
Fuses for Bombs, rockets, and missiles
Primers for gun ammunition
Shipboard
Primers for large gun ammunition
Fuses and charges for mines, depth charges, and torpedoes
Table 19. COMPARISON OF SENSITIVITY OF THREE









Charging Voltage to Achieve 1%
Firing Probability (volts)
Energy for 1% Firing Probability (ergs)
Constant Voltage for 1% Probability (volts)


















Table 20. SAFE DISTANCE RESTRICTIONS FOR HERO UNSAFE
ORDNANCE: [Ref. 28 : p. 3-5]
Frequency
(MHz)
Transmitter Output in k\Y (AVERAGE)








































































Table 21. MINIMUM SUSCEPTIBILITY ENERGIES
CIRCUIT ELEMENTS: 1962-1970 [Ref. 34]
FOR VARIOUS
Item Minimum Energy (Joules) Malfunction
Losic circuit 2 x 10- g Circuit upset
Integrated circuit 4 x 10- 10 Circuit upset
Memory core 3 x 10- 8 Core erasure bv wirine
Amplifier 4 x 10- 21 Interference (noise)
Relay 1 x 10-' - 1 x io- 3 Welded contacts
Microammeter 3 x 10- 3 Slammed meter
Transistors
PNP audio 3 x 10- 2 burnout
NPN switching 1 x 10- 5 - 1 x 10-5 burnout
PXP switching 1 x 10~ 2 - 1 x io-4 burnout
Diodes 1 x 10~3 - 1 x io- 5 burnout
SCR 3 x 10~ 3 burnout
Vacuum tubes 1 - 2 burnout
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Figure 5. High Altitude EMP Electric Field Lines: Electric field contour at the
earth's surface from a high altitude nuclear detonation. Corresponding
magnetic field strengths can be up to 200 ampere turns per meter, which
is 10 times that of the magnetic field of the earth at sea level. [Ref. 3:
p. 327]
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Figure 6. High Altitude EMP: E.MP generated by a high-altitude detonation
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Figure 8. EMP Pulse Frequency Signatures: [Ref. 3: p. 330]
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Northern hemisonere
Con,ugate point M|fror poJm
'. Ct C, /", /Geomagnetic field line
To southern hemisphere




Current loops Current loops
Figure 10. Surface Burst EMP: [Ref. 3: p. 334]
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Vertical comoonent of the E Field three leet above the
deck exorcised m volti oer meter for one watt radiated
power at a given communication frequency.








Vertical Of Loop Ant»nn«
Undivided umbilical cables form wjrticai
or looo (nnfinu couoling energy directly







Dielectric filled gaos form slot antennai
coupling tnargy into weapon.
Bndgewire
Aperture Antanna
Open access door forms aperture antenna
coupled to cylindrical cavity, inttmal
wiring forms loop! or proMs to couple




Idl Conduction of RF Are
The RF arc striking an uprotected EED lead
can causa low freouencv and DC current* to
flow m ma EED circuit even though the filter
>« used for protection.






A MINIMUM Of THttE SKIN OEFTHS THICK:
..,., 10 MILS Al ANO 40 MILS TIQ I MHl.
DIELS.CTT C SKIN;
INSUM IHAt NO C0NT1OL LINKS LIS
OUSCTIY IF.NEATH SKIN. WHf.lt FOSSttU
AFFLY (CONTINUOUS Ol STITF1 CONOUC-




SKIN CUMENT INOUCID VOLTAGE BUILD-
UP AT JOINT. IF JOINT IMPtDANCf. IS
MUCH HIGWf I THAN IMFfDANCE OF
ADJOINING MATEIIALS. THIS WOULD
ALLOW EMF ENEIGY TO COUHJ INTO
STtUCTLM.
1. US CUAN ANO SMOOTH ION0ING
SU*FACtS.
2. AVOIO SHAIP COINHS.
3. unifoim ptt ssmt along joint thigh
FtESSUU DESIIAILFI.
i. CWM FILMS.
COUFLES EtECTIOMAGNtTlC FIELDS INTO
rrmjOLBE. h-field penetiation Ptt-
OOMINATIS NEAJI CENTS* OF STtllCTUtE.
E-FIELD PENSTIATION DOMINATES AT
ENDS OF STUUCTUM.
1. MINIMIZE NUMMI ANO SIZE OF APEJTLJMS.
2. WAVEGUIDE AFFtOACH (LENGTH- DtAAMTTJ '
J GfvES > »4 el FOI EMF.)
3. Wl« M SH AFFtOAOI (250* A«f> COVEl-
AGE ANO 40 C* MO«t STIANOS PEI
WAVELENGTH)
L4^^SH




1. CltCUMFEtENTIAlLY CONNECT FLEXIILE
CONOUCTOI (..§.. UAICI TO SHAFT ANO
SKIN.
2. SHIELD CAJLE5 NLAJ SHAFT.








IOUTE CAIL£ AtOUNO AFEITIKE IF
FHACTIdE.
J. IOCATE CAIU NEA« CIOUNO FtANE
(MOUILY SKIN).
>. E-FIEIO APHOACHES Z£«0 NEAJ
GMDUNOFONE.






I. «Ol/TE CA»IE AIOUNO AFtlTUtE IF
FtACTlCAL.
J. SHIEIO CAKE NEA« SICT.




EMF TRANSIENTS ON THE WIRES OF A CABLE ARE SIMILAR IN AMPLI-
TUDE AND PRASE. A DIFFERENTIAL AMPLIFIER WILL, THUS, ONLY




THE BALANCING TRANSFORMER WILL CONVERT UNBALANCED





THE PROBABILITY OF FLIP FLOP UPSET CAN BE REDUCED BY USING A
CLOCKED FLIP FLOP WITH A CLOCK TIME GREATER THAN SEVERAL







LOW PASS FILTERS ATTENUATE THE HIGH FREQUENCY COMPONENT
OF THE EMP CURRENT TRANSIENT. THE FILTERS SHOULD ABSORB
RATHER THAN REFLECT THIS ENERGY.
7
tOW PASS Fl
THE DIODES WILL LIMIT THE INPUT VOLTAGE. DIODES MAY HAVE TO
BE SERIESED TO GET THE DESIRED INPUT VOLTAGE. ZENER DIODES
AND SPARK GAPS MAY ALSO BE USED.VOLTAGE LIMITATION
LOGIC LEVEL SHIFT i
THE ZENER DIODE WILL RAISE THE LOGIC THRESHOLD AND REDUCE
THE NUMBER OF EMP TRANSIENTS WHICH WILL TRIGGER THE
SWITCH:
LOGIC UPSET CIRCUMVENTION
Figure 22. Circuit Hardening Against Transient Upset: [Ref. 39: p. 65-13]
TECHNIQUE COMMENT
DEVICE SELECTION
LARGE JUNCTION DEVICES REDUCE THE PROBABILITY OF JUNCTION
BURNOUT. THESE DEVICES ARE, HOWEVER, INHERENTLY SOFT TO
NEUTRONS. COMPROMISE REQUIRED.
•H 4 CURRENT LIMITING RESISTORS (-lOtl) REDUCE JUNCTION POWERDISSIPATION. ZENER OIODES LIMIT THE BACK BIAS JUNCTION VOLT-AGE. SPARK GAPS AND VARISTORS CAN ALSO BE USED FOR VOLTAGELIMITING. THE DISADVANTAGES OF EACH OF THESE DEVICES MUST,
HOWEVER, BE CONSIDERED BEFORE USAGE.JUNCTION PROTECTION
THIN FILM RESISTORS
RT 26916
THIN FILM RESISTORS BECOME ELECTRICALLY OPEN UNDER VOLTAGE
PULSING. WHERE POSSIBLE, THESE RESISTORS SHOULD NOT BE USED
AT INTERFACES.
Figure 23. Circuit Hardening Against Permanent Damage: [Ref. 39: p. 65-13]
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• iifilai chokEi oesifeo aicuir fathi causeo iy MuiTicONoucrot
CA»L£ AH ONLY wlAKLY COUFUO TO THE COt« , WHCOAS COMMON
mooi imfi is stiongly couruo ano thus inoucttvely attenuated
> IALANCEO TlANSFO«MEtl CONVEITS AM UNtALANCEO SIGNAL TO A





• FILTEIl LOW FASS FILTHS ATTENUATE TMf HIGH FUGUENCY COMFONENT




Figure 24. Passive Protective Devices: [Ref. 39: p. 65-11]
• SFAtK GAFSi OEFENOON INITIATING CONDUCTIVE IMAKDOWN IN A GAS.
SFAI* GAF5 Alt IIFOLAI IN OFf (ATIOM ANO HAVt LOW VOLTAGE D«OF
WHEN CONDUCTING. ALMOST ALL FOWE» MUST K MOVED TO
EXTINGUISH IONIZATION.
• ZENE I ANO SIUCON OlODISi OFf «Atl EFFECTIVELY IN VOLTAGE -CUMENT




• THVtITT:, A NONUNIAI (ESISTANCE WITH AN UNUSUALLY HIGH FOWEt
WSJIFAnON CAFAQTY.
V „ V V*
• HYIFIOSi COM1INES MTTEI fEATUIEJ OF ACTIVE ANO FAiSIVE ELEMCN
" S T \
Figure 25. Active Protection Devices: [Ref. 39: p. 65-11]
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Figure 26. Allocation of Protection: [Ref. 6: p. 87]
5 10 IS 20 25
System ooeration duration ih|
20





















Figure 29. A Typical Shielding Measurement: The numbered circles represent
points where connections can be made (pons). The upper solid line
represents a drive circuit, with a signal source having an internal
impedance Z, connected to port 1. and a load Z2 connected to port 2.
The dashed line represents a shield separating the drive and sense
circuits. The bottom solid line represents a sense circuit, with a load
Z3 connected to port 3, and a detector with internal impedance Z4



































Figure 30. Typical Shielding: Compartment Discontinuities-Proper and
Improper. [Ref. 17: p. 33]
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is i result or current floving through normal metal resistance
corrosion, metal joints, mechanical damage, etc.. wla increase
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SINGLE POINT GROUNOING
SINGLE POINT GROUNDING ELIMINATES 1 . A GROUNO JUS MAT BE SEOUIRED.
SENSITIVE CmajITS SHOULD IE AT THE FAR EM OF THE KB *ERE GROUNO




TRANSFORMER (0» DIFFERENTIAL AMPLIFIER) COUPLING CAN BE USEO FOP
CIRCUITS SEPAPATEO 9T LARGE OISTAHCLS ANO/OR GROUNOCD TO CHASSIS
OR FRAMES. »
?
JPPEARS AS Com* HOSE ACROSS THE TRANSFORMER AND
THUS ITS EFFECTS ARE MINIMIZE). CROSS COUPLING LIMITS THE HIGH
FREQUENCY RESPONSE OF THE ISOLATION SCHEME. Y, MUST NOT EXCEED
THE INSULATION iREAUXM POTENTIAL.
CONNECTION OF SIGNAL ANO SHIELD GROUNDS MINIMIZE V, EFFECTS.
L • 0.005 h [z.3 Lo? (^) • O.S 0. Z23s(Sj|i) j «M
h. w, t. In InehM
L MUST «E LESS THAN 0.025 uH
CAUTION: IR 10 - 100 MNi RANGE. L MAT RESONATE UITH STRAT CAPACITANCE














Sndgewire Shield Bond At EED Can
Figure 33. Differential Mode of RF Excitation in a Two Wire Firing










Shield Bond At EED Case


















— Shield Bond At EED Case
Figure 35. Coaxial Mode of RF Excitation in Two Wire Firing System: [Ref. 17:
p. 19]




























' TIME LAPSE ( », )
Figure 36. Temperature Versus Time Explosive Relationship: Chart Showing
Temperature Versus Time Relationship Governing Typical Explosive
Reaction [Ref. 28: p. 2-1]
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"'Calculation of MNFC if the recorder detects a current:
Information- 1000 mA MNFC of EED
Available power = 30 m\V cm2
Recorder Sensitivity = 20 mA
Required Environment = 100 ra\V cm2
,
frequency
Response- Recorder reading = 50 mA
Calculation- 50 mA 1000 mA= 0.05x 100=5% MNFC
*Calculation of MNFC if the recorder does not detect a current:





- 36.5 mA/1000 x 100 = 3.6% MNFC
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Figure 39. Illustration of the Cumulative Heating (Stacking) of an EED: [Ref.
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_. CO, . CO,
^®i)-Tj^T-3" [(« + *) tan I ( 7-^)-(.-6)tan- 1(^r )J (121)
B.HIGH-PASS FRACTION (above a lowest limit cuj
**&*- 1 ~ fiowi^i)
#
(122)






4a(a 2 - b 1 )
?m* : 3 ( 124 )
C.BAND-PASS FRACTION
han<&>, Att) = ^fow(w + Aco) - Ftow(a>). (125)
When Aco < < a>:




) r Acq 1 ,.-,.Uw,Aw)^Aw — s -£- (126)
Figure 42. Antenna Filter Equations: [Ref. 34]
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Figure 43. Loop Antenna with Tuning Capacitor: [Ref. 35]
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Fig. 2 MEASURED AND COMPUTED
VALUES OF EED CURRENT
ANTENNA: LOOP D- 1.2 m
d • 5 mm
Copperwir*
CAPACITOR: 0-330 '•
E • I V/m '.. ','
COMPUTED DATA: SOLID LINES
MEASURED DATA'. X
"fED " ' fl
Figure 44. Measured and Computed Values of EED Current: [Ref. 35]
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d • I mm














i i V —+ y








.,--_•-. --"- 2 : - - :



















Current Causes Ohmic Heating <=










value for mean current of 0.259 amps #max = 122 °C
value for max current of 0.300 amps 6max = 170 °C




t= 10 x 10-' seconds
CP = 2.4 microjoulesj °C
R = 0.2 ohms
I'R
y - rRx [i]-^
Rt
Value for mean current of 374.4 amps 6 = 112°C
Value for max current of 500.0 amps 6 = 20S°C
Value needed for current of 900.0 amps 6 = 675°C
(127)
(128)
Figure 49. Example of Current to Temperature Transfer Function
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